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Single Mothers' Equal Right to Parent:
A Fourteenth Amendment Defense
Against Forced-Labor Welfare "Reform"
Benjamin L. Weiss*
My name is not Lazy, Dependent Welfare Mother.'
If the unwaged work of parenting, homemaking and
community building was factored into the Gross Na-
tional Product,
My work would have untold value.'
In a dramatic shift of values from the original goals of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)2, the latest wave of
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A_ 1994, Uni-
versity of Minnesota. I would like to thank Julia Dinsmore, Mary Devitt, Eliza
Erickson and the Mother's Union for educating me about the injustices of "welfare
reform" that I have cast in constitutional terms in this article; the editors and oth-
ers who offered comments on various drafts, particularly Professor Arthur Eisen-
berg, Laurel Haskell, Christopher Lee, James McConnell, Margaret Ware and
Melissa Weldon; Christopher Petersen, Anne Becker, Beth Docherty, Lesley Hay-
den, Rinky Parwani Manson and Mark Siegel for their attention to detail; and my
parents, Ricky and David Weiss, for support of both tangible and intangible kinds.
Special recognition is due to Jill Sanders for retyping the entire article after the
computer destroyed both the main and backup copies of the page proofs!
My life has been immeasurably enriched by my contact with a number of chil-
dren who, in the absence of public assistance, would in all likelihood not be alive
today. I dedicate this article in particular to my "little brothers," Wintersun Le-
mieux and Robert Lemieux Jr., and to Daniel, Isaac and Jacob Dinsmore.
1. Julia K. Dinsmore, "My Name Is Not 'Those People,"' Copyright 1992.
Used by permission.
2. AFDC, which remains in place at this writing, is colloquially called simply
"welfare." It provides cash assistance as an entitlement to families with children
whose incomes fall below levels determined by the individual states in which they
reside. Grants are reduced one dollar for every dollar a recipient earns in the la-
bor market. The program is jointly funded by federal and state governments.
Based on the mothers' pension programs that many states enacted in the 1910s
and 1920s, AFDC was enacted nationwide as part of the Social Security Act of
1935. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NoT ENTITLED 1-13, 37 (1994).
The major goal of AFDC is to enable single mothers to care for their children
at home. Id. at 23, 45-46. Before the establishment of mothers' pensions, most
children in orphanages or foster care were not orphans, but had living parents who
lacked jobs or child care. Id. Originally restricted to widows who could provide a
caseworker's version of a "suitable home," AFDC coverage expanded gradually un-
til a series of court decisions in the 1960s invalidated various eligibility tests which
states had used to deny AFDC to racial minorities. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN &
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federal welfare "reform" emphasizes moving poor single mothers3
into the workplace by any means necessary. In addition to man-
dating states to adopt "workfare" programs, which require AFDC
recipients to work outside the home in exchange for their benefits, 4
RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 306-14 (2d ed. 1993). In 1988, Con-
gress mandated that states provide AFDC to two-parent families. See WALTER I.
TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE (4th ed. 1989).
Because the term "welfare" properly describes a wide variety of programs for
the middle class as well as the poor, this Note refers to cash aid for poor families
with children as "AFDC," although laws enacted in the last year call for the aboli-
tion of the present AFDC program.
3. For convenience, this Note will refer to parents receiving AFDC in female
terms. In Minnesota, 93% of single-parent families receiving AFDC are headed by
women. Most Families on AFDC Are Small, Have One Parent, YOU SHOULD
KNOW... (Children's Defense Fund-Minnesota.), Jan. 1994, at 1. Framing the
issue in terms of women is appropriate because much of the current wave of
"reform" relies on gender-based stereotypes, particularly regarding reproductive
behavior. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, The Work Ethic State, in POINTS OF LIGHT: NEW
APPROACHES TO ENDING WELFARE DEPENDENCY 52 (Tamar Ann Mehuron ed.,
1991) (referring to a "welfare culture of women who have babies without thinking
seriously of either working or marrying someone who works").
4. The "welfare reform" bill President Clinton signed on August 22, 1996,
mandates states to have 50% of aid recipients "engaged" in paid employment, un-
paid "work experience" or "community service" for at least 20 hours per week by
the year 2002. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103, § 407(a)(1), 407(c)(1)(A), 407(d), 110 Stat.
2105, 2137-38 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11,
13, 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 31 and 42 U.S.C.; unless otherwise indicated, the sections
cited in this Note are to be codified at 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 104-193].
This figure does not include women who leave public assistance for employment
entirely. Jean Hopfensperger, A Walk in One Working Mom's Shoes, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Aug. 23, 1996, at 1A. Job search or "job readiness assistance" can
qualify as "work" for up to six weeks in a given year (no more than four weeks con-
secutive) or twelve weeks if the employment rate of the state (not the mother's re-
gion of residence) is 50% above the national average; vocational education training
can qualify for up to one year. Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103, §§ 401(c)(2)(A)(i),
407(d)(8). States have the option to exclude mothers with infants under one year
old in calculating their quotas. Id. sec. 103, § 407(b)(5). Mothers who refuse to
"work" have their assistance reduced proportionately to the number of "work"
hours under 20 per week (or more, at the state's option) or terminated. Id. sec.
103, § 407(e)(1). Single parents of children under six can avoid reduction or termi-
nation of aid by demonstrating an "unavailability" of "appropriate" child care, but
the mother bears the burden of proof and the state, with its "work" quota, gets to
determine "availability" and "appropriateness." Id. sec. 103, § 407(e)(2). Conse-
quently caseworkers appear to have complete discretion in determining which
families to subject to the work requirement.
Previous versions of the Act required aid recipients to enter into a binding
"personal responsibility contract" with the state, which included a "negotiated"
cutoff date for benefits within the five-year maximum; failure to fulfill one's end of
the "contract" would have resulted in a reduction and eventual termination of
benefits. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 405(a) (1995). Although the bill stated
that the contract became invalid if the state failed to comply, id. § 405(a)(2)(D), the
one-sided nature of a state's "bargains" with destitute families invite traditional
contract law questions of adhesion, duress and unconscionability. The enacted
version did away with the contract language, instead placing total discretion on
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recently enacted federal legislation, the so-called Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Act, has adopted two drastic means
toward achieving this goal: placing a five-year lifetime limit on re-
ceipt of benefits and ending the status of AFDC as a federal
"entitlement," transforming it into "block grants" which give states
license to deny cash assistance altogether to some or all families.5
caseworkers to develop "individual responsibility plans" which families must sign.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103, § 108(b). These plans will contain "employment
goals" and "obligations" which the family must follow or risk the reduction of bene-
fits by "such amount as the state considers appropriate." Id. For a cogent argu-
ment that courts should apply the same contract law concepts to conditions placed
on welfare benefits in this manner, see Charles R. Bogle, "Unconscionable" Condi-
tions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1994).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103, §§ 401(b) (denial of entitlement) and
408(a)( 7) (five-year time limit). The Act also allows states to set a shorter time
limit than five years; the time limit applies only to benefits received as an adult,
and the state may (but is not required to) exempt a family from time limits by rea-
son of "hardship" or if a member of the family has "been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty." Id. sec. 103, § 408(a)(7)(C). However, when combined, these ex-
ceptions may equal no more than 20% of the state's total caseload. Id. sec. 103,
§ 408(a)(7)(C)(ii). Although a state can exempt a family on grounds of hardship,
"hardship" is not defined, nor is there a specification of when domestic abuse must
have occurred in order to exempt a family from time limits, nor of who determines
the veracity of an abuse claim. If the abuse must be proven in court, the vast ma-
jority of victims will be missed. See RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST, 45
(rev. ed. 1992) (stating that very few domestic abuse claims result in arrest);
Kathleen J. Ferraro, Cops, Courts, and Woman Battering, in VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: THE BLOODY FOOTPRINTS 165, 171-72 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen Geil Mo-
ran eds., 1993) (finding that many guilty offenders find ways to intimidate and
manipulate women to drop charges). Considerably more than 20% of AFDC recipi-
ents have experienced domestic abuse. See, e.g., RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., THE WAR
ON THE POOR 46 (1996); see also infra note 29 and accompanying text.
Currently, roughly 82% of AFDC recipients at any point in time will receive
more than five years of benefits over their adult lives. See U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, WHERE YOUR MONEY GOES: THE
1994-95 GREEN BOOK 441-42 (1994) [hereinafter 1995 GREEN BOOK]. Although
typical stays on AFDC are short, roughly half of families who leave the program
return. Total lifetime AFDC receipt averages six years. ALBELDA ET AL., supra, at
60-61. The five-year limit will therefore impact large numbers of families.
It is important to note, however, that only approximately 35% of people who
begin to draw benefits during a given year will receive five years or more of bene-
fits. The percentage of long-term AFDC recipients is high at any point in time, but
low compared to the total number of women and children who receive support from
the program at some point. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra, at 442. The Center for
Popular Economics illustrates the dynamic this way:
Imagine a 10-bed hospital in which 6 of the beds are occupied through the
year by chronically ill patients who do not leave the hospital. The other 4
beds, though, are occupied by patients who stay just 1 month.... At any
one time, 60% [of the ten people] in the hospital ... will be there the en-
tire year; but only 6 of the 54 who pass through, or 11% spend the entire
year there.
ALBELDA ET AL., supra, at 60.
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As a means of challenging these draconian policies, the Four-
teenth Amendment, at first glance, seems an unusual vehicle for
protecting mothers and children from having their means of sup-
port cut off.6 Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has been
unremittingly hostile to equal protection claims by the poor,7 par-
6. Some commentators have suggested that "workfare" programs are vulner-
able to a Thirteenth Amendment challenge as they are largely indistinguishable
from forms of peonage that the Supreme Court has struck down as involuntary
servitude. See generally Cynthia A. Bailey, Workfare and Involuntary Servitude-
What You Wanted to Know But Were Afraid to Ask, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285
(1995) (comparing "workfare" with peonage arrangements outlawed by the Su-
preme Court in the early 20th century); Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340 (1994) (comparing "workfare" with various types of im-
permissible servitude and arguing that it constitutes both physical and legal coer-
cion). Some lower courts, however, have with little explanation upheld "worfare"
against such challenges. See, e.g., Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S. 2d 39 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1973) (upholding state statute requiring "work relief' recipients to par-
ticipate in work projects in order to receive assistance); Dublino v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 348 F. Supp. 290, 297 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (upholding state's work rules
requiring employable welfare recipients to report to the state for employment re-
ferrals before receiving assistance checks).
In contrast, time limits and withdrawal of entitlement appear less vulnerable
to a Thirteenth Amendment attack because, although forcing labor is an explicit
goal of the measures (see infra note 223 and accompanying text), the means may
not amount to the "physical or legal coercion" that the Rehnquist Court has ruled
necessary to support an involuntary servitude claim. See United States v. Koz-
minski, 487.U.S. 931, 944, 951 (1988). Although intuitively policies affecting the
need to feed oneself and one's children should qualify as "physical coercion," a
court might decide that this sort of coercion is intrinsic to the capitalist system.
Furthermore, the government may claim that the mere placement of a time limit
on a benefit, such as unemployment compensation, has never been held to violate
the Thirteenth Amendment.
The threat that a child of a parent whose benefits have been cut off could be
placed in foster or institutional care may amount to legal coercion, but the
strength of this link depends upon the laws of the various states. This argument
is hampered by the fact that policies of removing children from indigent families
were common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See MARILYN IRVIN HOLT,
THE ORPHAN TRAINS (1992); TRAITNER, supra note 2. However, the modern consti-
tutional doctrine of parental rights developed after these policies were discontin-
ued, and subsequent case law provides strong protections against involuntary re-
moval of children from their parents' homes. See infra Part II.A.
The parental rights and equal protection arguments developed infra also apply
to "workfare," and a freestanding fundamental rights claim is possible to the ex-
tent that such programs force parents to involuntarily place their children in day
care and interfere with the right to set one's own balance between employment
and childrearing. Other portions of the Act, such as its exclusion of legal aliens
from assistance, invite separate Fourteenth Amendment attacks distinct from
those discussed in this article. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title IV (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
7. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (upholding user
fee for busing to public school); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (upholding exclusionary zoning); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying low-income plaintiffs standing to challenge exclu-
sionary zoning); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding filing fee to
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ticularly where welfare benefits are involved.8 In the context of
current federal law, however, time limits on AFDC and denial of
entitlement status raise a two-part Fourteenth Amendment claim:
discriminatory distribution of government benefits in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause which, in turn, implicates the funda-
mental liberty rights of parents in raising their children, as guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause. 9
The vast majority of AFDC recipients are single mothers with
the sole responsibility for their children's upbringing.10 These
declare bankruptcy); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(upholding differential funding of schools based on district property wealth); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (allowing communities to require referendum ap-
proval of low-income housing, although a previous case had held similar referen-
dum on housing built pursuant to Fair Housing Act unconstitutional).
Earlier cases, however, invalidated discrimination on the basis of poverty. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating residency requirements for
AFDO); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll
tax for state elections); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (mandating free
counsel for indigent in criminal appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(striking filing fees for criminal appeals on grounds they denied equal justice to
poor); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating "Okie law" crimi-
nalizing bringing indigents into state). The Burger Court distinguished these
cases as involving "fundamental interests" in voting, travel and criminal due proc-
ess.
8. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state law preventing
Medicaid funding of elective abortions for indigent); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (extending Maher to medically necessary abortions); Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upholding filing fee to protest reduction in benefits); Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding state's setting AFDC levels far lower
than benefits for elderly or disabled); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(upholding cap on AFDC benefits regardless of family size).
Almost all the cases that strike conditions on receipt of public assistance on
constitutional grounds involve established fundamental rights or suspect classifi-
cations. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (gender); New Jersey Welfare
Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (out of wedlock childbirth); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(procedural due process); Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (interstate travel); but see United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating rule denying
food stamps to households containing unrelated individuals). Importantly, all
these cases involved the absolute denial of benefits, similar to what time limits
would impose, as opposed to reduced levels or conditions. See infra note 119 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this distinction.
9. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V
(applying due process guarantees to federal law: "[no person shall] be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). The Fifth Amendment has
been held to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection standard
against the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
See infra Parts I.A and I.A for the development of these constitutional rights
through case law.
10. Single parents head 87.7% of AFDC households. See 1995 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 5, at 401.
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women are responsible not only for putting food on the table and
roofs over the heads of their children but also for caring for them
during illnesses, advocating for their interests in dealing with
schools and other bureaucracies, maintaining discipline and safety
and passing on religious and ethical values. Prior to the latest
wave of welfare "reforms," single parents had at least some choice
in striking a balance between these competing demands. A mother
who felt that her children needed her supervision full-time could
decide to go on AFDC rather than work outside the home, al-
though this choice would frequently result in a considerable reduc-
tion in their standard of living." (As a practical matter, and con-
trary to the stereotype, most recipients draw AFDC out of
necessity rather than choice. 12 The Supreme Court, however, has
11. The government has heavily, and deliberately, skewed the choice against
AFDC by maintaining benefits at extremely low levels. See 1995 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 5, at 364, 367. Even minimum wage, if earned full-time, year-round
and in combination with the Earned Income Tax Credit, amounts to considerably
more than AFDC for a typical family of three; child care costs and other work-
related expenses, however, frequently negate the difference. ALBELDA ET AL., su-
pro note 5, at 58. In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court has held that the
state may use its coercive power to skew choices in the exercise of privacy rights in
order to promote its own values. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 859-61 (1992) (affirming a state's right to encourage women to choose child-
birth rather than abortion); accord Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-76 (1977).
12. In order to qualify'for AFDC, a family must have an income less than the
grant amount, which was 38% of the poverty level in the median state in 1994.
1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 367-70. In the late 1960s, federal law man-
dated that "employable" AFDC recipients be placed into jobs, with training, health
care, transportation and child care offered. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 2, at
382-83. At that time, only 10% of recipients were deemed "employable," and only
one in five of those were successfully placed into jobs. Id. This low success rate
likely resulted from the lack of jobs and the inability of caseworkers to recognize
the many reasons why work outside the home is impractical for many AFDC re-
cipients; these reasons range from chronic illness that fails to rise to the level of
disability to the time-consuming demands of child-rearing and survival on a sub-
poverty-level income. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
Moreover, fewer women likely receive AFDC by choice today than in the
1960s, given that the real value of AFDC benefits has plummeted 47% in the me-
dian state since 1970. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 377. Virtually all
AFDC mothers indicate a desire to work outside the home, at least part-time, and
surveys show, in fact, that most do out of sheer need. See, e.g., Kathryn Edin &
Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 205-21
(Christopher Jencks ed., 1992). Some mothers, however, feel that their children's
need to have them at home outweighs any benefit that could be gained through job
training programs or through working outside the home for long hours. Benjamin
L. Weiss, The Word from Above, the Voice from Below: Contrasting Priorities in
Fighting Single Parent Poverty 43-44 (1994) (unpublished B.A. sunmmna cunt laude
thesis, University of Minnesota (Minneapolis)) (on file with author).
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rejected the suggestion of a constitutional claim to assistance
based on need. 13)
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that parents them-
selves have the fundamental right to make the most important
choices affecting their children's upbringing. 14 Precedent seems to
clearly indicate that the government cannot require mothers to
work outside the home on pain of criminal sanctions or the threat
of loss of their children. With time limits or outright denial of
benefits, however, most single mothers will no longer have the op-
tion of caring for their children at home. Rather, after five years of
benefits or upon first losing a husband, a mother will be forced to
choose among limited alternatives: to enter a waged labor market
characterized by part-time, temporary and/or poverty-wage jobs,
likely depriving her of virtually all contact with her children if
waged work can be found at all;15 to marry or cohabit with a man
13. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (holding that the Constitu-
tion grants no fundamental right to subsistence).
14. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (finding that
a grandmother has a right to live with two grandchildren who are cousins); Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (concluding that a teacher has
right to continue working while pregnant); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(stating that Amish parents have the right not to send their child to school after
eighth grade); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an unwed fa-
ther has a right to custody of his children after their mother's death); Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents have a right to choose
private school for their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (stating
that parents have a right to teach their children foreign language). For a discus-
sion on the issue of governmental intrusion versus the failure to subsidize such
rights, see infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
15. Part-time and temporary jobs are the fastest-growing sector of the labor
market, currently accounting for one-quarter of all jobs. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE
POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 21 (1990). The number of workers involuntarily em-
ployed only part-time increased 178% from 1970 to 1993. AMERICA'S NEW WAR ON
POVERTY 81 (Robert Lavelle ed., 1995). In 1992, 18% of full-time, year-round
workers earned too little to raise their families out of poverty, a 50% increase since
1979. Id. In 1991, nearly half of all employed women earned a wage too low to
raise a family of three out of poverty after day care costs, even if working full-time
and year-round. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 67. In 1993, the Children's De-
fense Fund of Minnesota calculated that a single mother in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area with two children, ages 4 and 7, working a full-time job
paying the average wage received by graduates of Minnesota's job training pro-
gram for AFDC recipients, would come out $542 short of expenses every month.
Many Families Leave AFDC But Can't "Make It," YOU SHOULD KNOW Children's
Defense Fund-Minnesota), Sept. 1993, at 1.
Given these circumstances, most mothers would need to take a second job,
part-time, simply to keep up with housing and child care costs, depriving them of
virtually all contact with their children. The government may defend this di-
lemma as a consequence of having additional children while on AFDC. But this
defense is unconvincing when it is considered that a woman can exhaust her five
years irrespective of whether or not she actually had children during the time that
she was on AFDC. Because the limit is cumulative over the mother's lifetime, she
19971
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capable of supporting her and the children;16 to give up her chil-
dren; or to resort to a life of destitution and uncertain dependence
on relatives, charity and crime, with the likely result of loss of
children to protective services. In this situation, a mother has ef-
fectively lost the ability to exercise her fundamental rights under
the Constitution.
The major weakness of this argument is the line of Supreme
Court cases that hold that the government need not subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right.17 However, the government al-
ready grants one group of single mothers, those eligible for Social
Security Survivor Insurance (SI), a subsidy to exercise their paren-
tal rights. This group includes widows with children and divorced
mothers whose former husbands have died.'8 The government is
drawing a line between two classes of women and children based
could have had the child during a period of employment or marriage between two
spells on AFDC.
16. Leaving aside the constitutional issues involving marriage as a fundamen-
tal right beyond interference by the state, see e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (striking down a state statute requiring certain groups of people to ob-
tain a court order permitting them to marry), finding a gainfully employed man is
often an unrealistic prospect for long-term poor women, particularly for African-
American women in urban ghettoes. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED 63-92 (1987). A woman could potentially enter a cooperative ar-
rangement with another single mother, caring for both sets of children while the
other mother worked outside the home, or perhaps each working a job and caring
for the other's children in their off hours. However, the low pay of many jobs
available to single mothers makes it unlikely that the employed mother would
want to support two families, and the model of coordinating job hours carries too
many practical difficulties to function as a large-scale national policy. Such ar-
rangements also depend on mothers having significant social ties, which are diffi-
cult to maintain among poor families which move frequently and may lack access
to telephones and cars. See, e.g., AMERICA'S NEW WAR ON POVERTY, supra note 15,
at 121 (citing Census Bureau statistics that 18.5% of poor households lack phones);
Weiss, supra note 12, at 31 (finding that AFDC recipients report moving very fre-
quently due to inability to keep up with rent and other factors).
17. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (stating that the federal govern-
ment need not fund medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (holding that states need not fund elective abortions for poor women). For
full discussion of this point, see infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
18. If a husband has worked long enough and recently enough to be "fully and
completely" insured by Social Security, on his death, his widow or surviving di-
vorced spouse and children are eligible for SI. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 402(d)(3),
416(h)(3)(A)(I) (West 1994). To be eligible, a child normally must have either lived
with or been supported by the father; this is presumed except where a father's
biological child is born out of wedlock. Id. Such a child can still draw SI if s/he can
produce the father's acknowledgment of paternity in writing, or if a court decreed
paternity or ordered child support. Id. A child can draw SI on the death of a step-
father if s/he lived with him for nine months prior to his death. Id. § 416(e)(2).
A mother may draw SI if she has "in her care" an SI-eligible child under age
16 that is hers by biology or adoption. Id. § 402(g)(1). A child can receive SI until




solely on their prior relationship to a man, allocating the mother's
freedom of choice-as well as cash grants which provide the very
necessities of life-according to a classification system that ap-
pears on its face to be blatantly irrational. By challenging the gov-
ernment's choice-subsidizing only one group of single mothers-
under the Equal Protection Clause, AFDC recipients can avoid the
threshold question of whether the government must subsidize ex-
ercise of the right to any group of mothers at all. Moreover, the
fact that a fundamental right is at stake, even where the govern-
ment has no obligation to actively facilitate its exercise, heightens
the scrutiny with which a court will evaluate the classification of
mothers and children. 19
The purpose of this Note is to develop this legal challenge to
the government's punitive policies of selectively denying subsis-
tence to women and children. 20 Part I provides a hypothetical il-
lustration to clarify the equal protection issue. Part II examines
the Supreme Court's case law on parents' liberty rights under the
Constitution and explains how AFDC cutoffs affect these constitu-
tionally protected interests. Part III.A surveys the equal protec-
tion case law surrounding issues of welfare and family composition
as well as the different standards of review that a court could ap-
19. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 115 S.Ct.
2510 (1995) (applying strict judicial scrutiny to unequal subsidy of free speech);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny because a statu-
tory classification affected the fundamental right to marry); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to classification affecting fundamental
right to interstate travel); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969) (applying strict scrutiny to classifications affecting voting rights).
20. To the extent possible, this Note is intended to suggest a legal theory with
a realistic chance of success. Thus, I distinguish a number of Supreme Court cases
which I feel were wrongly decided rather than arguing for overruling them. I also
base my attack on welfare "reform" on its likely effects rather than on a pure legal
theory or moral or philosophical argument. This Note is written from a standpoint
of immediate damage control; I do not analyze or attempt to remedy the social
conditions that produce the need for public aid for parents and children or the po-
litical conditions that have produced enthusiasm for a brutally punitive welfare
policy. A non-exhaustive list of works particularly helpful in understanding these
issues includes: THERESA FUNICIELLO, TYRANNY OF KINDNESS (1993) (exposing the
prejudice faced by AFDC recipients and the role of the social service industry in
preventing meaningful solutions to poverty); MICHAEL B. KATz, THE UNDESERVING
POOR (1989) (analyzing factors shaping changes in AFDC ideology from the 1960s
to the 1980s); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID
(1993) (examining how racial segregation produces urban poverty and social dislo-
cation); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 2 (analyzing social welfare history in class
terms); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG (1995) (discussing the inter-
secting roles of race and gender in shaping AFDC policy); Nancy Fraser & Linda
Gordon, Contract Versus Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United
States? SOCIALIST REV., July-Sept. 1992, 45-67, 459 (analyzing social welfare his-
tory in gender terms).
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ply to the AFDC-SI distinction. Part III.B evaluates the two forms
of benefit denial under two standards of review suggested by the
fundamental rights case law: (a) the Court's test for state interfer-
ence in parental rights articulated in Prince v. Massachusetts21
and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 22 and (b) the "undue burden" test applied
to privacy rights in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.23 The Prince-
Yoder test posits that parental rights are fundamental, thus func-
tioning as a form of strict judicial scrutiny, and the "undue bur-
den" standard appears to approximate an intermediate level of
scrutiny. Any issues not discussed under these specific tests are
addressed in the context of rational basis review. Part III.C as-
sumes this worst-case scenario of the Court's total rejection of the
fundamental right claim and evaluates the AFDC-SI distinction
under rational basis review.
I. The AFDC-Survivor Insurance Distinction Illustrated
In designing welfare programs for needy children and their
parents, the government allocates two sets of interests. The first
is the means of survival; the second is the freedom of parents to set
the balance between parental supervision and day care in their
children's upbringing.24
Although falling wages have required many two-parent fami-
lies to have two wage earners, many such families still retain some
measure of flexibility in meeting their parental responsibilities.
Some two-parent families can arrange work schedules so that one
parent is always home; others can arrange time with children at a
cost of a lower standard of living by having one parent voluntarily
stay home or work only part-time. Mothers in these situations,
therefore, retain some degree of parental rights over their chil-
dren's upbringing. By nature, single mothers lack these rights in
the absence of a source of income outside the labor market, which
AFDC cutoffs deny. 25 Under a time-limited welfare plan, most
21. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
23. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See infra text accompanying notes 202-06.
24. See infra Part II for a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment
of parents' liberty rights and the effect AFDC cutoffs have on these rights. Natu-
rally, a spectrum of possible child care arrangements exists, with a middle range
entailing leaving one's children with friends or relatives for varying degrees of
compensation. The basic premise that forced labor requires parents and children
to involuntarily spend time apart, however, does not change when the substitute
care is in a more .intimate setting rather than a commercial or state-run day care
center.
25. Outside of employment, the major alternative to AFDC is support pay-
ments from the child's father. Inadequate child support enforcement is a signifi-
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single women simply have no option but to work outside the home,
perhaps after a grace period of a few years. 26
Within the class of single mothers, however, the government
has singled out one group to retain its rights of parental choice.
The new "welfare reform" law neither places time limits on nor
ends the entitlement status of the SI program, which allows wid-
ows, surviving divorced wives and children of workers insured
through Social Security to collect significantly higher benefits,
with fewer restrictions, than AFDC.27 Under the new federal
"reforms," whether a divorced woman is left without a choice as to
how to raise her children, and whether the children are left with
no means of support, will depend entirely on whether her husband
happens to die within five years of the divorce. 28
cant cause of AFDC receipt: "In 1991, only 56% of custodial mothers were
awarded child support payments, and only half of [those] received the full amount
due." ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 50. One survey of divorced fathers found
that two-thirds spent less monthly on child support than on their car payments,
and that more than half were delinquent in their child support even though their
car payments were up-to-date. Id.
However, according to one researcher, collecting 100% of the child support or-
dered would only cut AFDC by 25%. Id. at 51. Many fathers of children on AFDC
simply lack the money to pay any meaningful support. See id. Also, after the first
$50, women receiving AFDC are required to sign their child support rights over to
the state, and even after the mother leaves AFDC, the state retains the initial
right to collect any arrears. Id. For other means of support available to some sin-
gle mothers, see infra note 26.
26. Some single mothers will manage to retain parental choice rights because
of adequate income from rents and other property or specialized government pro-
grams such as veterans' benefits. The first category is a wealth classification not
defined by government action, see supra note 7, and thus immune from an equal
protection challenge. A court could distinguish veterans' benefits and other spe-
cialized pensions as contractual obligations on the part of the government. Single
mothers receiving disability benefits for themselves or their children, of course,
are materially different in their situations from women receiving either AFDC or
SI. The relatively small number of children whose caregiver's support derives
from Social Security Old Age Insurance present a closer case, but again, one can
argue that there are greater material differences between a retiree and an AFDC
parent than between a divorcee with a living husband and a divorcee whose hus-
band subsequently died.
27. For a wife and her children to be eligible for SI, the worker must have
worked in Social Security-insured jobs for a certain numbers of years, including
roughly half of the three years before death. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5,
at 5-8. For the other eligibility requirements of SI, see supra note 18. While
AFDC is reduced by one dollar per dollar of earned income, SI is reduced on a
sliding scale, allowing up to $8040 of earned income in 1994 with no reductions.
1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 19; see also infra note 124 (discussing further
the dollar for dollar reduction of AFDC). In 1993, a family of three on SI received
from $780 to $2301 per month in benefits, averaging $1527. See 1995 GREEN
BOOK, supra note 5, at 37. In 1994, an AFDC family the same size would receive
$366 per month in the median state, plus $295 in food stamps. Id. at 366-67.
28. An equal protection claim centered on the AFDC-SI distinction could be
brought by children as well as by parents, as children have equally little control
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To illustrate the consequences of the distinction between SI
and time-limited welfare benefits, imagine two fictional married
couples in the year 2010: Frank and Eleanor Anderson and Har-
old and Phyllis Brown. Both husbands are employed at jobs pay-
ing the national median wage and fully covered by Social Security.
Both wives have high school diplomas and are on their second
marriages; each fled an abusive husband after giving birth to a
child and spent a year on welfare before marrying their current
husbands.29
One evening, neither Mr. Anderson nor Mr. Brown returns
from work. The next day, both women receive calls from divorce
lawyers; their husbands have left them for younger women.
Shortly thereafter, both women discover they are pregnant. Six
months later, seeking to avoid child support authorities pursuing
delinquent payments,30 Mr. Anderson and Mr. Brown drive off to-
gether with their paramours for the Mexican border. En route, the
slightly intoxicated driver careens into a telephone pole. Mr. An-
derson is killed in the crash. Mr. Brown, however, survives, gets
the car repaired during his hospital stay and completes his run for
the border.
Mrs. Anderson and her children immediately apply for SI, to
which they have an entitlement. Mrs. Anderson decides to stay
home with her infant. Her grant is enough to cover necessities, al-
though she can afford few luxuries. When Mrs. Anderson's young-
est child begins school, she takes a part-time job that corresponds
with school hours. When her oldest daughter, who receives bene-
fits because she was supported by her stepfather,31 takes up with a
boyfriend Mrs. Anderson distrusts, Mrs. Anderson cuts back on
her work hours in order to deep an eye on her. Mrs. Anderson
draws SI for herself for 16 years and receives a grant for her
youngest child until he graduates high school.
After draining her savings during several futile attempts to
collect child support, Mrs. Brown realizes that she has no choice
over whether their father is alive.
29. A University of Michigan study found that in 45% of current and former
AFDC families surveyed, either the mother or the children had suffered repeated
domestic abuse. Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Contemporary Re-
lief Debate, in THE MEAN SEASON 45, 98 n.22 (Fred Block et al. eds., 1987). Other
studies place the figure at over 50%. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 46; see also
WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 7 (citing studies showing that approximately 60% of
all poor women, and 50% of women in homeless shelters, are poor because they
fled abusive relationships).
30. For a discussion of the frequency of child support delinquency, see supra
note 25.
31. See supra note 18.
[Vol. 15:215
SINGLE MOTHERS
but to apply for welfare - even if she did not feel that her new-
born needed her at home, the jobs she can find do not pay enough
for day-care. 32 Mrs. Brown is lucky - she has no entitlement to
aid, but her application happens to be processed the day before the
state's quota is reached. Mrs. Brown receives a monthly grant at
38% of the poverty level, reduced by one dollar for every dollar she
brings in.3 3 Most of her time is spent navigating charity bureauc-
racies, with her baby in her arms.3 4 After two years, a social
worker informs her that she needs to do 20 hours per week of
"community service" work. Fortunately, however, the Supreme
Court invalidates this section of the 1996 "welfare reform" law on
Thirteenth Amendment grounds before Mrs. Brown's benefits are
cut for noncompliance. 35
The real problems begin after four years on welfare. The
state had job training programs, but Mrs. Brown could not partici-
pate because she never made it to the top of the waiting list for
subsidized child care. 36 Now, Mrs. Brown's benefits are due to run
out, and her youngest child is still not old enough to start school.
Mrs. Brown manages to find a poverty-level job and works double
shifts to cover housing and day-care costs, but has to miss three
weeks of work when her entire family catches the illness her
youngest child brought home from his unsanitary day-care cen-
ter.37 When she returns, she is fired. Ineligible for any benefits
32. Employed mothers of preschool children pay more for child care in an aver-
age month than a minimum-wage worker earns in a week, and child care costs
erase the earnings advantage of a minimum-wage job plus the Earned Income Tax
Credit over AFDC. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 53, 58. Combined with exces-
sive housing costs, unsubsidized child care is simply impossible to afford for single
parents working only one job. See infra note 125.
Half of all women workers earn wages lower than $6.67 per hour, the amount
necessary to raise a family of three out of poverty and pay day care costs for one
child when working full-time, year-round. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 67.
The average entry-level wage for women with high school diplomas is just over
$6.00. AMERICA'S NEW WAR ON POVERTY, supra note 15, at 86.
33. See supra notes 11 and 27 and infra note 124.
34. See infra note 125.
35. See supra notes 4 and 6.
36. A recent New York Times article estimated that welfare "reform" would
add 300,000 children to the "tens of thousands" in New York City who meet the
income requirement for subsidized child care but do not receive it. Joe Sexton,
Welfare Mothers and Informal Day Care: Is It Up to Par? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1996, at B1.
37. The federal child care block grant proposed in 1995 would have eliminated
the requirement that states enforce minimal health and safety standards for pub-
licly funded child care. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 53. Wisconsin has al-
ready received a federal waiver to abolish all quality standards for day-care pro-
grams associated with welfare "reform." Ruth Conniff, Cutting the Lifeline: The
Real Welfare Fraud, PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1992, at 25, 27. Moreover, between 60%
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except food stamps,38 the family is evicted and relocates to a
homeless shelter. Mrs. Brown's oldest daughter, who had brought
her boyfriend home every day after school while her mother was at
work, announces she is pregnant; her state does not give assis-
tance to unwed teenage mothers, and Medicaid will not pay for an
abortion.39
Mrs. Brown is unable to find another job after being fired;
there is plenty of competition from other mothers who have ex-
hausted their welfare benefits. The family's allotted time in the
shelter expires and they move to another. The Brown children are
unable to go to school for lack of clothes and a permanent ad-
dress. 40 Eventually, a social worker notices the children's plight
and gets them removed from Mrs. Brown's custody on the grounds
that she is not providing for their basic needs. 41
and 90% of family day-care homes-the most common type of child care-are un-
regulated. EDWARD F. ZIGLER & MARIA FINN STEVENSON, CHILDREN IN A
CHANGING WORLD 238 (Vicki Knight et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).
38. The food stamp program remains an entitlement under the Act, but these
benefits may be reduced. Rev. Chris Morton, Harmful Welfare Reform Bill, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 1, 1996, at A18. For example, in Minnesota the Act will
reduce food stamp benefits on average from 80 cents to 66 cents per person per
meal. Id.
39. Medicaid can fund only a subset of medically necessary abortions under a
federal law known as the Hyde Amendment, which the Supreme Court upheld in
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
40. Although some cities have made progress in educating homeless children,
most school districts still use permanent addresses to determine a child's resi-
dence. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (upholding requirement
of district residence that acted to exclude citizen child living apart from alien par-
ents). Most schools also have minimum standards for students' attire, such as re-
quiring students to wear shoes. For example, the St. Paul Public Schools' policy on
student dress states: "Bare feet are not acceptable according to public health
rules." Board. of Educ., St. Paul, Minn., Student/Dress Code 504 (1974). The
Minneapolis Public Schools allow individual schools to set "acceptable minimum
standards for student dress," but otherwise leave the decision to students and par-
ents except in case of an "obvious health hazard." Pub. Schs. Minneapolis, Minn.,
Student/Dress Policy 5460 (1984). Some schools are likely to classify bare feet as
an "obvious" hazard, either because of concern for students or fear that a child's
cut foot could lead to lawsuits against the school.
As far back as the 1930s, writers noted that social pressures could effectively
force poorly-dressed children out of school even if they were allowed to attend. See
JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 435-36 (Penguin Books 1986) (1939). As
a practical matter, in Minnesota and many other parts of the country, a child who
lacked shoes, long pants or a coat would likely miss much of the school year due to
a physical inability to walk all the way to school or to wait for the school bus in
winter.
41. Some states remove children from their families solely on grounds that the
family is homeless or has inadequate housing, a practice likely to become more
common as large numbers of mothers encounter the prospect of never attaining
adequate income. See infra notes 107-09 (discussing the implications of placing
children in foster care). The foster care system itself may create barriers to reuni-
fication of a family thus separated. See id.
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The distinction between SI and AFDC has here allowed a
single stroke of luck to direct previously identical families into
tragically different situations. Although this result would seem to
match any common definition of the word "irrational," the Su-
preme Court's record of extreme deference to Congress on issues of
social welfare 42 indicates that denying children the very necessi-
ties of life on an essentially random basis might not constitute suf-
ficient grounds to overturn the "welfare" reform law. The law of
equal protection, however, provides another basis for requiring the
Court to closely scrutinize the relationship between the classifica-
tion of parents and children and the putative goals of welfare
"reform": the legislation selectively denies women such as Mrs.
Brown the right to raise her children and make the basic decisions
involving her children's upbringing. 43
II. Parents' Rights Under the Constitution
A. Development of the Doctrine
The Supreme Court first recognized the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to privacy, now most closely associated with birth con-
trol and abortion, in a pair of cases in the 1920s. In Meyer v. Ne-
braska,44 the Court struck down a state statute forbidding the
teaching of foreign languages to elementary school children. In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,45 the Court invalidated a law requiring
children to attend only public schools. Both cases were decided on
substantive due process grounds, i.e., that the laws in question in-
truded on the "liberty" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 46
The Meyer court concluded that the liberty interest, "[w]ithout
doubt," included the right to "establish a home and bring up chil-
dren"47 and "the power of parents to control the education of their
own [children]. '"48 This power derived from "the relation between
42. See supra note 8 and infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
43. The Court has repeatedly held that parents have certain basic rights in the
upbringing of their children which constitute fundamental interests protected
against unnecessary government interference. This is discussed in the next sec-
tion.
44. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
45. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
46. Pierce was also decided partially on substantive economic due process
grounds, i.e., that the law deprived private schools of property interests in their
business. Id. at 535.
47. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
48. Id. at 401.
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individual and State ... upon which our institutions rest."49 Pierce
simply followed Meyer to hold that the Due Process Clause granted
parents the "liberty... to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."50
Meyer and Pierce have served as the basis for a wide range of
privacy rights under the Constitution, including the fundamental
right to heterosexual marriage, 51 the right to freedom from forced
sterilization,52 the right to contraception 3 and the right to abor-
tion.54 The Supreme Court, however, has referred to the facts of
Meyer and Pierce in dicta more than it has developed the rights
they established. The next key case in developing the Meyer-Pierce
line was Stanley v. Illinois,55 which declared that parents have an
interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of
their children that "undeniably warrants deference" absent a
"powerful countervailing interest."56  Stanley dealt with the
49. Id. at 402. The Court wrote:
In order to ... develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven
into barracks and intrusted [sic] their subsequent education and training
to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately ap-
proved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between
individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our in-
stitutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could
impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence
to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Id. This passage would appear to doom the plans of welfare "reformers" such as
Mickey Kaus to remove children from the homes of mothers who would not (or
could not) work outside the home and place them in orphanages to be inculcated
with the "work ethic.". See Kaus, supra note 3, at 32-33. However, orphanages
still existed at the time of the Meyer decision, although they were not favored. See,
e.g., HOLT, supra note 6, at 173; TRATTNER, supra note 2, at 108-09.
50. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
51. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating a rule restrict-
ing marriage of prisoners); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a
law forbidding marriage without court order for a state resident owing child sup-
port); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a law prohibiting inter-
racial marriages).
52. The Court established freedom from sterilization as a general principle in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating statute providing for ster-
ilization of certain criminals).
53. The Court relied on Meyer and Pierce to declare a right of married couples
to contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). It extended that
right to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and to
minors in Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), established the right to abortion
in part as an extension of Meyer and Pierce, and the Court reaffirmed both that
right and the validity of those cases in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
852-65 (1992) (striking a requirement that a woman seeking abortion notify her
husband, but upholding a 24-hour waiting period and other restrictions).




"custody" aspect, invalidating a state law that presumed that un-
wed fathers were unfit.57 Stanley also established that the Consti-
tution does not "[refuse] to recognize those family relationships
unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony." 58
The Court further developed the right to custody in Santosky
v. Kramer,59 in which it held that the state must prove long-term
neglect by clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to a mere
preponderance of the evidence, in order to terminate parental
rights consistent with procedural due process. The Santosky Court
ruled that "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in
the care, custody, and management of their child does not evapo-
rate simply because they have not been model parents .. .. *"60 In
other words, Santosky not only held parents' interests to be fun-
damental, requiring invasions of those interests to be narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest, but established that the
Constitution protects more than just traditionally favored types of
families. 61
The Court has also ruled that unwed fathers have a right to
block a mother's attempt to put their child up for adoption, but the
state has no duty to provide fathers with notice if they have not
supported or had contact with the child.62 The Court had already
57. Id. at 646. As a result of this law, Stanley's children, whom he intermit-
tently lived with and supported from birth but whose mother he had never mar-
ried, were declared wards of the state upon their mother's death. Id.
58. Id. at 651.
59. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
60. Id. at 753. The Court expressly rejected the state's claim "that a parental
rights termination proceeding [did] not interfere with a fundamental liberty inter-
est." Id. at 754 n.7. However, the Court had held the previous year that the inter-
est was not so fundamental as to require appointment of counsel for all hearings to
terminate parental rights. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981).
61. The Court did reach an outer limit in its protection of diverse family types
in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Michael sought visitation rights
with a child he had fathered with a woman married to Gerald, and advocated
striking a state law that presumed the husband of the mother to be a child's fa-
ther. Id. Though Michael had lived with the child for a brief period before the
mother reconciled with Gerald, the Court held that nothing in American tradition
required constitutional protection for "adulterous" fathers. Id. at 131. Michael H.
can be seen as an extension of the cases holding that raising a child, rather than
biology, creates the constitutional tie and that the child's custodial parents have
the right to define the family unit. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text;
see also Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW &
INEQ. J. 489, 506 (1996). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852-53
(1992), the Court explicitly rejected the implication that Michael H. limited consti-
tutional protection only to family types favored by tradition.
62. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.C. 380 (1979) (establishing the basic right
of an unwed father to block a mother's attempt to put child up for adoption). In
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court stated that "[wihen an unwed
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held in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families6 3 that biology was
not the factor triggering constitutional protection of the custody
interest, citing the rights of adoptive parents as an example. In
Smith the Court established the source of parental rights, ex-
plaining that the liberty interest in family privacy derived from
"intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in 'this Na-
tion's history and tradition'," and further stating that these free-
doms were "older than the Bill of Rights."64 The Court used this
reasoning to hold that foster parents did not share the substantive
due process rights of natural and adoptive families, because what
parental rights they had derived from a "knowingly assumed con-
tractual relation with the State" rather than from the ancient
sources of other parental liberties.65
The same year, the Court reaffirmed the historical justifica-
tion for protecting the rights of the family in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,66 when it invalidated an ordinance which prevented a
child from living with his grandmother, uncle and cousin. Rea-
soning that extended family members were often involved in the
types of child-rearing decisions at issue in Meyer and Pierce, the
Court in Moore extended the fundamental rights of families to
cover these relationships as well as acknowledging a right to de-
fine the family unit. 67
The Court does not appear to have defined parents'
"companionship" interests under Stanley in any way distinct from
their "custody" interest. The closest it has come is articulating a
right of "intimate association" in Roberts v. United States Jay-
cees.68 Justice Brennan wrote:
[Blecause the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual
liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of cer-
tain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State . . . . [C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a
father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood ...
his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection ....
But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection." Id. at 261.
63. 431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977).
64. Id. at 845 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
65. Id.
66. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). The plurality theorized that conso-
nance with tradition was the reason why Meyer and Pierce, alone of the decisions
of their era, survived the demise of the substantive due process doctrine. Id. at
501 n.8.
67. Id. at 498-99, 504.
68. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
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critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cul-
tivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs ....
[I]ndividuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from
close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from
unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the abil-
ity independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty.69
Justice Brennan identified "[tihe personal affiliations that
exemplify these considerations" as "those that attend the creation
and sustenance of a family-marriage .... childbirth .... the rais-
ing and education of children .... and cohabitation with one's rela-
tives."70 Brennan made these remarks in a negative context, how-
ever, in distinguishing them from the Jaycees' desire to exclude
women from their organization, and the Court has since done
nothing to define the limits of the doctrine.
The Stanley interests most directly traceable to Meyer and
Pierce, those in the "care and management" of children, have had
the sketchiest elaboration. In Prince v. Massachusetts,7 1 the Court
upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness under child labor
laws for allowing her niece, with whom she lived, to distribute re-
ligious literature. Justice Rutledge recognized that Meyer and
Pierce had respected a "private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter," but held that "[a]cting to guard the general interest
in a youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or pro-
hibiting the child's labor and in many other ways."7 2 The Court,
however, narrowed the apparent breadth of Prince in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,7 3 which upheld the right of Amish parents to withdraw
their children from school after the eighth grade on grounds of re-
ligion and parental rights. Yoder held that "the power of the par-
ent ... may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child,
or have a potential for significant social burdens."74 The facts of
Yoder indicate that parental control is broad indeed, despite Chief
Justice Burger's emphasis on the unique aspects of Amish culture
69. Id. at 618-19.
70. Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
71. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
72. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted). The Court stated that "[a]mong [the] evils
most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment." Id.
at 168.
73. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
74. Id. at 233-34.
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which prevented its children's lack of education from causing
"significant social burdens. 75
A final case that bridges the gap between parental and re-
productive rights is Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,76
which invalidated a school district regulation that laid teachers off
upon their fifth month of pregnancy and prevented them from re-
turning to work for at least three months after giving birth. La-
Fleur stated that "freedom of personal choice in matters of mar-
riage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."77 Thus, the Court
cast the issue in terms of individual choice. On its facts, LaFleur
also guaranteed the right of a woman to choose her own balance
between employment responsibilities and the demands of preg-
nancy, 78 a balance which could easily be extended to decisions con-
cerning childrearing. LaFleur, however, was decided on a due
process theory that the Court later abandoned, although La-
Fleur-along with Stanley, which used similar logic-is still valid
precedent.7 9
75. Id. at 234. The facts of Yoder could distinguish it from the case of welfare
cutoffs because Yoder involved issues of religious freedom and cultural preserva-
tion. Id. The main thrust of the opinion, however, emphasized the Amish parents'
rights over their children's upbringing.
The Court has read Yoder somewhat more narrowly in holding that it does not
grant parents the right to send their children to racially segregated private
schools. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976). Runyon involved the
competing interests of the African-American children's right to attend those
schools and of African-American parents' right to direct their own children's edu-
cation. Id. at 176. In the case of AFDC cutoffs, the state lacks any such interest
compelling enough to override the parental rights of mothers. See infra Part III.B
and III.C.
76. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
77. Id. at 639-40.
78. Id. at 642-43.
79. In the same term, the Court decided Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(holding that pregnancy was not a suspect classification and did not implicate gen-
der discrimination). Congress later statutorily overruled Geduldig, amending Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (codified as amended 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000(e) (West 1994)). The LaFleur majority, however, avoided
Geduldig by ruling that the ordinance created a presumption that pregnant
women were too disabled to work without offering any opportunity to refute it,
thus violating the procedural due process right to a hearing. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at
640. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972), the Court used similar logic in
invalidating the presumption that unwed fathers were unfit parents, although it
also used equal protection logic in distinguishing unmarried fathers from unmar-
ried mothers and married parents. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975),
however, the Court upheld eligibility classifications for Social Security on the
ground that under rational basis review, generalized rules were appropriate if the
difficulties of individual determinations, in Congress' mind, outweigh the benefits.
Subsequently, the Court ignored the irrebuttable presumption doctrine in up-
holding mandatory retirement ages and welfare restrictions. See, e.g., Lyng v.
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Despite the lack of specifics in this line of cases, one is struck
by the broad, uncompromising language in which members of the
Court from William Brennan to Warren Burger embrace the doc-
trine of parental rights, despite its lack of mention in the Constitu-
tion. Justice White wrote in Stanley that
the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic ar-
rangements' . . . . The rights to conceive and to raise one's
children have been deemed 'essential,'. . . 'basic civil rights of
man,' . . . and '[r]ights far more precious .. . than property
rights. 80
Other Supreme Court cases have made similar declarations:
"The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing
of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition."8 ' This role is "basic in the structure of our
society."8 2 "Lassiter declared it 'plain beyond the need for multiple
citation"' that the parental interest "is an interest far more pre-
cious than any property right."8 3 "[C]ertain intimate human rela-
tionships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State
because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the indi-
vidual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme."
8 4
Despite the lack of specific case law and the Supreme Court's
antipathy to the poor, it is quite possible that there is room for the
rights of welfare mothers under the breadth of these words.
B. Application of Parental Rights to Welfare "Reform"
The Supreme Court has put weighty language behind the in-
terests of parents and children, but so has every politician in
America. The Court has left no doubt that the scope of that lan-
guage includes single mothers and parents whose lifestyles are not
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding presumption for food stamp eligibility
purposes that parents, children and siblings living together buy and prepare food
together); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per
curiam) (upholding mandatory retirement age for police officers).
80. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
81. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
82. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.12 (1977) (quoting
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629. 639 (1968)).
83. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 475, 758-59 (1982) (citing Lassiter v. De-
partment of Soc. Servs. 452 U.S. 18 (1981)).
84. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
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considered "model" by society at large.8 5 The question is whether
the substance of the language will extend to protection, at least in
the abstract, of a single mother's right to choose not to work out-
side the home.8 6
The idea of broad parental rights of choice is supported by
Meyer, Pierce, Yoder and most on point, LaFleur. The right at is-
sue here is the mirror image of LaFleur: logic would suggest that
if the state lacks the power to prevent a mother from working out-
side the home, it also lacks the authority to force her into such
employment.8 7 The implication of LaFleur is that a woman has
the constitutional freedom to choose her own balance between
childbearing-and by extension, childrearing-and employment,
or at least to make the choice between full-time occupation with
one or the other.
Despite the clear language of LaFleur, framing the issue in
terms of choice sounds rather radical in the context of current ju-
dicial politics. The present Supreme Court has used "history and
tradition '8 8 as a guide to what privacy interests are protected, with
some odious results.8 9 One cannot, however, dispute that tradition
85. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of the separate question of government subsidization of
the right to choose to stay at home with one's children, see infra notes 109-26 ac-
companying text.
87. On the same principle, a state under most circumstances can neither pre-
vent pregnancy through sterilization, nor bar its prevention through contracep-
tion. Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (barring forced steriliza-
tion as a general principle) with Griswold. v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(acknowledging a fundamental right of married couples to use contraceptives).
Similarly, while the state must provide procedural safeguards to prevent errone-
ous termination of parental rights under Santosky, it also must work to prevent
erroneous assumption of parental duties. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981)
(requiring states to pay for blood tests in paternity suits where the state is trying
to enforce support for a child on AFDC and where alleged father is indigent).
The government may claim that economic circumstances rather than state ac-
tion have forced single mothers into the workplace. This argument can be refuted
on its face to some extent by noting the role of government policy in creating and
maintaining poverty, see infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text, and that in
some situations, such as where the mother's poverty leads to the loss of her child
to foster care, the state is unequivocally involved in the deprivation of rights.
However, the argument is largely irrelevant in this case because the instant chal-
lenge is to a selective deprivation of the fundamental right according to a statutory
classification which the state inarguably created.
88. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
89. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a statute
criminalizing consensual sodomy). The Court rejected Hardwick's privacy chal-
lenge on the grounds that the Constitution had no tradition of protecting "the fun-
damental right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Id. at 190. Similar slavish
adherence to tradition would dictate upholding racial segregation.
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supports the idea of mothers staying home with their children. 90
The Court writes that its "decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."91 This logic has protected caretaking roles from the unwed
father to the grandmother from most state intervention. In this
context, even a judge who insists on using "the teachings of his-
tory"92 as a guide to constitutionality could hardly allow Congress
or a state to outlaw the role of stay-at-home mother for most un-
married women.93
Whatever the source of the rights, Yoder, Meyer and Pierce
establish that within broad limits, parents have the primary
authority to choose the style of their children's "care and manage-
ment."94 Logically, the right to decide how much time one's child
should spend under direct parental supervision, and how much
time can safely be spent in whatever day care is available, should
flow from the right to decide how much, or what kind, of education
the child needs. 95 The chance of jeopardizing the child's future as
a result of the mother's decision to stay at home with him or her
full-time seems far less than that from the denial of education al-
lowed in Yoder.96
90. I do not intend to downplay the oppression that forced women into the role
of full-time caregiver over the centuries, nor to imply that the family forms that
allowed for this role were ever shared across all classes. See generally STEPHANIE
CooNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA
TRAP 155-63 (1992). Although only some families are able to afford placing moth-
ers in a full-time caretaking role, that lifestyle has a long tradition as ideal which
will be difficult for a tradition-minded judge to ignore. I believe that full-time par-
enting should be available as an option for at least one parent in all families,
whether supported by tradition or not.
91. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 504. A judge might note that the ideal of the stay-at-home mother
was never a reality on any large scale for the poor, see COONTZ, supra note 90, be-
fore the inception of mothers' pensions, the predecessor to AFDC. Even consider-
ing the Supreme Court's hostility to wealth discrimination claims, however, see
supra notes 7-8, a judge would have difficulty explaining why these rights should
differ along class lines given the Court's broad language about the traditional im-
portance of family rights.
94. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
95. See supra note 15. One right that Meyer, Pierce and Yoder implicate even
more directly is the right to make decisions related to a child's education. This
could be important in states that allow parents to educate children at home, pro-
viding a ground for an equal protection claim that AFDC time limits deny virtually
all single-parent families the explicit state-granted right to home-school children.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 120.101 (7)(6) (1996) (allowing parents to educate their
children if they comply with reporting requirements).
96. See infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, among the explicit rights guaranteed between par-
ents and children are "companionship"97 and "intimate associa-
tion."98 These rights, in combination with the aforementioned
rights of personal choice, should allow a parent to choose, within
reason, the amount of time spent in their children's company.99
Furthermore, as a practical matter, a single parent moving from
AFDC into the job market would likely need to work so many
hours that virtually all opportunity to associate with her child
would be lost.100 The purpose of the intimate association doctrine
is to facilitate the definition of a child's identity, a development
"that is central to any concept of liberty[.]"'1' It should therefore
be difficult to justify state policies that prevent a defined group of
parents from spending any significant amount of time in intimate
association with their children.
The parental right most commonly identified in the case law
is custody, which implicates time limits or denial of AFDC benefits
in two ways. 0 2 One question not answered in current welfare
"reform" proposals is what happens to the children of mothers who
cannot find work, or work-related essentials such as child care,
when benefits are denied or exhausted after five years. State child
protection services are currently not equipped to deal with large
classes of parents entirely unable to provide their children with
the necessities of life. 0 3 A likely result is that many children will
97. Stanley, 405 U.S. at, 645.
98. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
99. For practical reasons, it is probable the Court will not want to grant two-
parent families a fundamental right to have both parents stay home with the chil-
dren and receive public support. Although it would appear fair, and consonant
with traditional ideals, to grant a right to "intimate association" equal to the
equivalent of one parent at home full-time, this could lead to a fear of major judi-
cial interference in the economic structures which often produce a need for both
parents to work outside the home. In defining this right under the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, the Court would only be prohibiting conduct that could be
characterized as "state action." In the litigation described here, the Court need
only recognize that the right exists in the abstract, i.e., that Congress or a state
could not, for example, pass a law requiring all mothers, or all single mothers, to
work outside the home on pain of criminal sanctions in order to trigger strict scru-
tiny. See supra note 19.
100. See supra note 15. These rights could also be litigated from the opposite
direction, advocating for a child's right to associate with his or her parent, but
children's rights to associate with parents have not been well-defined by the
courts. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Rights of
Children to Maintain Relationships With Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV.
358 (1994).
101. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
102. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
103. Courts in New York and Illinois have found those states to engage in a
practice of removing children from their parents due solely to homelessness or
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be removed from their parents and placed in either foster care or
institutions.10 4 Even without reference to the equal protection is-
sue, this should violate Stanley's presumption of parental fitness 05
and the broad due process rights established in Santosky.10 6 Stan-
ley, on its facts, prohibits using marital status as a surrogate for
fitness to parent; poverty is hardly a marker of greater unfitness
than the abuse and neglect the Santosky children allegedly suf-
fered.10 7 Because the parental custody interest is a fundamental
substandard housing, without first attempting to provide housing-related services
as a preventive measure. See, e.g., Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D.
Ill. 1990); Martin A. v. Gross, 524 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1987), affid, 546 N.Y.
App. Div. 1989). Even though in those cases the failure to provide preventive
services violated applicable law, the practice is likely to become more widespread
when large numbers of single mothers are left with no realistic prospect of ever
receiving enough income to pay for housing. Also, although Norman and Martin
A. did not directly address constitutional issues, the preventable removal of a child
by protective services should constitute the state action necessary to support a
Fourteenth Amendment parental rights claim distinct from the equal protection
issue detailed in this Note.
104. See supra note 103.
105. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. In supporting the current
welfare reform, the government may try to distinguish Stanley and Santosky on
the ground that they involved permanent legal termination of parental rights on
the state's initiative. In the case of welfare time limits or other denial of benefits,
the state could claim that it is only removing children temporarily to give parents
time to improve their circumstances, or until the children are old enough not to
need day care. Moreover, many parents whose benefits have expired are likely to
place their children in foster care themselves, rather than waiting for the state to
intervene. The state could argue that it is not responsible for these women's deci-
sions.
The only difference between Stanley and Santosky and the situations de-
scribed above, however, is formal. Some foster care placements may be
"voluntary" in the sense that it is the mother who takes the initiative, but the
state has unilaterally placed her in a situation of having no other realistic choice.
The standard for the degree of state coercion that prevents an action from being
voluntary is vague and depends on the totality of the circumstances. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (finding that consent in a
search and seizure demonstrated voluntariness). For a discussion of the state's
role in creating and maintaining poverty, see infra notes 120-26 and accompanying
text.
Furthermore, when a mother faces the prospect of only part-time, temporary,
or poverty-wage employment for which she must compete against millions of other
women in the same situation, as well as the rest of the unemployed population, see
supra note 15, she is likely to see little practical difference between "temporary"
foster care and legal termination of parental rights. If her children reach majority
before she improves her circumstances enough to reclaim them, her custodial
rights are effectively terminated. In the meantime, she loses her rights to her
children's companionship, care and management without ever receiving the due
process required by Santosky. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. The
children in foster care are actually worse off than if their mother's rights had been
legally terminated because they cannot be adopted.
The placement of children in foster care also brings the mother into the case-
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right, any state attempts to advance competing interests must be
narrowly tailored. One need not look hard for less intrusive means
of promoting children's best interest than depriving presumptively
competent parents of custody in a quasi-criminal proceeding. 108
work system, which can result in a "voluntary" placement becoming involuntary
after social workers begin to scrutinize the family's living conditions. See LOUISE
ARMSTRONG, OF 'SLUTS' AND 'BASTARDS': A FEMINIST DECODES THE CHILD
WELFARE DEBATE 76, 340 n.1 (1995) (describing as "far from unusual" an account
in Congressional testimony of a mother who placed her children in foster care
upon emergency surgery, then recovered to find the placement had become court-
ordered due to her "crowded" living conditions). Social workers have near-total
discretion to assign "conditions" for the reunion of the family, which may not re-
flect the family's economic needs or even be feasible. See, e.g., id. at 119, 322
(telling of a mother who was told to hold a job as condition of children's return and
to attend numerous meetings with social workers during working hours). See also
Martin A. v. Gross, 524 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1987), affd, 546 N.Y.S.2d 75 (App.
Div. 1989), and Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding
states engaged in the removal of children due to parents' homelessness when state
provided no housing assistance).
Finally, the interests in "companionship, care, custody and management" of
one's children set forth in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), are not nec-
essarily separable. They are interrelated components of a parent's right to direct
her children's upbringing in the absence of wrongdoing or significant risk of harm
to the child. The custody right has been the focus of most cases because it is easily
litigated. Permanent loss of legal custody is a more obvious deprivation than tem-
porary loss of companionship or choice among types of education, but the differ-
ence is one of degree, not overall effect. From the child's viewpoint, there remains
a question whether the state can deprive children of "intimate association" with
their mother in the absence of abuse or avoidable neglect on her part. See gener-
ally Holmes, supra note 100.
108. Not only does cash assistance not infringe on parental rights, but it costs
less for government than foster or institutional care for children. Minnesota cur-
rently pays foster parents a basic rate of $377 per month for one pre-teen child
without special needs. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 611. In compari-
son, the child's mother would have received $437 in AFDC for both the child and
herself. Id. at 610. History also demonstrates the relatively low cost of cash assis-
tance: In 1870, New York spent $109.59 per year for each almshouse resident,
compared to $8.96 for each recipient of cash relief. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note
2 at 3, 12 n.9.
A more expensive option for states would be to guarantee job placement
through public service employment, but this could interfere with other parental
rights by forcing single parents to place children in day care. Although the
mother's economic circumstances obviously play a role, see infra notes 111-26 and
accompanying text, it is difficult to argue against state action when the state pro-
vides jobs as an explicit alternative to subsidizing the mother's choice to remain at
home. Although the Court has allowed state and federal governments to subsidize
childbirth but not abortion, the government in those cases claimed an interest in
preserving the potential life of the fetus. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(upholding state's right to subsidize medical expenses for childbirth and pregnancy
but not abortion). Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that medi-
cally necessary abortions are not required to be funded by the state). Here, the
government lacks any substantiated interest to balance against the mother's
rights. See infra note 115 and Parts III.C and III.D.
For mothers whose benefits have been terminated, the alternatives to giving
up one's children are unrealistic to expect on a large scale. Heterosexual marriage
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Moreover, in divorce cases, some states' "best interests of the
child" standard appears to contain a bias against mothers who
work outside the home. In several recent, highly publicized deci-
sions, judges in New York, Michigan, Mississippi and the District
of Columbia have used maternal employment as a reason to grant
custody to fathers. 0 9
In these states, a mother whose husband does not have the
resources, or seeks custody after refusing, to pay child support,
faces an impossible situation in custody disputes, particularly if
she has ever received AFDC before. The Court makes a presump-
tion against her if she places the child in day care, but she has no
option to raise the child at home. Once again, she would be likely
to lose the child on grounds that have nothing to do with her
"fitness." This situation could be particularly damaging for chil-
dren since at least forty-five percent of current and former AFDC
recipients are victims of repeated domestic abuse)' 0 Given a
choice between an allegedly abusive father and a mother with a
is a fundamental constitutional right, and although government has the right un-
der Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), to use its power to influence
personal choices, the choice to marry still requires that a partner be available. See
supra note 15; see also infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text. Similarly,
sharing resources with friends or relatives depends on the existence of social net-
works that may not exist. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. If a pre-
ponderance of evidence indicating permanent neglect, as in Santosky, is not
enough to deprive a parent of her rights, a state certainly could not constitution-
ally take a child away based solely on the mother's lack of relatives. See supra
notes 59-61.
Even if the court denies facial challenges to time limits and loss of entitle-
ment, states' failure to fund job training and child care at adequate levels could
serve as evidence that states, in the application of the laws, were not taking ade-
quate steps to preserve parents' rights to custody of their children after their bene-
fits expired. Parents would need to seek joint liability for state and federal gov-
ernments for the deprivation of rights, since the federal government would be
setting the time limits, the state government would be administering its particular
program, and both would be providing inadequate funding for other options.
109. In the most notorious of these cases, a Michigan judge denied custody to a
mother who intended to place her child in long-term day care while she attended
college. Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), affd as modified
by, 547 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 1996) (circuit court order unpublished). The father's job
prospects were considerably bleaker, but his mother had promised to care for the
child. This decision was recently reversed on appeal. Id. In New York a judge
reversed two lower court rulings to award custody to an unemployed father rather
than an unemployed mother, despite the father's repeated refusal to pay child
support. Alice Steinback, Custody Wars, Career vs. Children" Women Face Diffi-
cult Choice, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 13, 1995, at 1D (discussing recent court deci-
sions granting custody of children to fathers because mothers were employed). A
District of Columbia Superior Court Judge denied custody to a senate aide on the
ground that she worked too many hours. Id. A Mississippi flight attendant whose
schedule required her to be away from home some evenings lost custody to a hus-
band with a nine-to-five job. Id.
110. See supra note 29.
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strong chance of losing her children to foster care or an orphanage
within five years, it is impossible to predict what kinds of tragic
decisions judges may make."'
The major problem with the argument that AFDC time limits
intrude on fundamental childrearing rights is that the government
can claim that the mother's economic circumstances, rather than
state action, have caused the deprivation. Thus, it can character-
ize the action as merely choosing to not provide a government
benefit facilitating the exercise of a right. The precedent for this
claim would be Maher v. Roe" 2 and Harris v. McRae,n 3 where the
Court held that the government had no constitutional obligation to
fund abortions for the poor, even though abortion was a funda-
mental right and, in McRae, medically necessary.
The first response to this argument is that withholding bene-
fits can be intrusive indeed when it results in mothers' loss of chil-
dren to the state." 4 The second is that Maher and McRae dealt
within the unique context of abortion and involved the govern-
ment's freedom to balance its interest in the life of the fetus
against the mother's fundamental right." 5 In the AFDC context
111. It is possible that the state's role in placing a mother in this sort of vicious
circle would qualify as the state action necessary to support a claim of deprivation
of custody rights independent from the equal protection argument. However, be-
cause the mother's economic status is also a factor in the deprivation of custody,
the state action is less clear than in the case of loss of a child to protective services.
See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
112. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
113. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
114. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text. In response to loss of cus-
tody, the government may argue that it has simply changed the nature of the lib-
erty interest at stake. See, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985) (finding that
the legislative change in benefit structure does not violate due process because
state determines property interest in the first place). There are two simple re-
sponses to this argument. First, according to Smith, 542 N.W.2d at 344, parental
rights are not in fact legislatively determined, but predate the Constitution itself.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text. It can therefore be argued that any
policy that intrudes on parental custody rights, in particular, is necessarily a posi-
tive imposition even if it comes in the form of withholding a benefit. Second, fam-
ly law is a traditional state responsibility in which the federal government cannot
intrude, even on the doubtful premise that the Constitution grants it the power to
do so, without a clear statement of intent to alter the federal-state balance of
power. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that Congress
cannot intrude into areas traditionally reserved for states without a clear state-
ment of intent to do so).
115. The equal protection argument in McRae centered on the funding of medi-
cally necessary procedures other than abortion, to which the Court responded that
"[a]bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other
procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life." 448 U.S. at 325.
Stating that Congress has a "legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life," id. at 324 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)), the Court
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by contrast, the state has few interests to balance against the
mother's right, and the means toward achieving those interests are
significantly removed from the statutory classification at issue." 6
Moreover, the Court has sometimes required the government
to pay for the exercise of fundamental rights, even in the area of
privacy. For example, the Court has required states to waive filing
fees for indigents seeking a divorce, on the ground that marriage is
a fundamental right and the state monopolizes the means of dis-
solving it." 7 The Court subsequently restricted that holding to
cases in which the state legally, rather than practically, preempted
all private means of exercising the right." 8 Nevertheless, this
demonstrates that Maher and McRae have limits. Additionally,
the Court has been typically more supportive of challenges to laws
that wholly deny welfare payments which are the sole means of
survival, as opposed to merely lowering benefit levels or placing
restrictions or conditions. 119
wrote that "Congress has established incentives that make childbirth a more at-
tractive alternative than abortion for persons eligible for Medicaid. These incen-
tives bear a direct relationship to the legitimate congressional interest .... Id. at
325. While characterizing complete deprivation of funding for indigent patients as
an "incentive" to make childbirth "more attractive" is an understatement at best, it
cannot be denied that this so-called "incentive" promoted the state's asserted in-
terests much more effectively than AFDC cutoffs do. See infra Parts III.B and
III.C.
116. See infra Parts III.B and III.C. Maher and McRae could also be described
as involving a state interest in not requiring citizens morally opposed to abortion
to pay for it with their tax dollars. This argument appears quite weak when abor-
tion is defined as a fundamental right, and in the context of other uses of tax dol-
lars that large numbers of citizens find morally offensive, such as the building of
new weapons of mass destruction. The government can hardly assert a similar
interest in support of refusing aid to poor families, since every Western religion
requires aid for the poor. See, e.g., Matthew 19:21 (stating that, "[If you want to
be perfect, go sell what you have an give to the poor ...."); Isaiah 58:7 and Mat-
thew 25:35 (commanding the faithful to feed the hungry, clothe the naked and take
in the homeless); 1995 WORLD ALMANAC 737 (giving of alms is one of the five major
duties of Islam).
117. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
118. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1988). Al-
though the state holds the only practical means of preserving the parental rights
of single mothers, it also held the only practical means by which the plaintiffs in
the abortion cases, which were decided after Boddie, could exercise their rights.
As in the instant case, the Court in Maher and McRae blamed the deprivation of
rights on economic circumstances rather than a states' action. See infra note 119.
119. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971) (upholding cap on
benefits regardless of family size), and Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972)
(upholding lower benefits for AFDC families than for equally poor elderly and dis-
abled), with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that states cannot
deny AFDC to non-residents), and Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974) (same for medical care). See also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85
(1979) (states cannot deny two-parent AFDC benefits on basis of gender); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that the federal gov-
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In addition, despite the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
address this fact, the government has played a role in creating the
poverty it now claims as an excuse for interfering in the parental
rights that have been held to predate the nation itself.120 Govern-
ment action has shaped the number, quality and remuneration of
jobs available, as well as the necessary supports for families in the
labor market. 121 Federal and state governments have played a
major part in determining the location of people and jobs,122 as
eminent cannot deny food stamps to households containing unrelated individuals);
New Jersey Welfare Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (finding that states cannot
deny non-AFDC welfare benefit to children born out of wedlock); Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (stating that states cannot deny AFDC to aliens);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (stating that a hearing is required prior to
cutoff of benefits). Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (finding that states can provide two-tier system of education to poor), with
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that a state cannot deny education to
children of illegal aliens). The Court explicitly noted the difference between abso-
lute and relative deprivation in distinguishing Moreno from Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635, 639 n.3 (1986), in which the Court upheld restrictions on food stamp re-
cipients' ability to qualify as multiple households.
The Act does not abolish or place time limits on food stamps for families with
children, so families who exhaust their time limits will still have some access to
food. See supra note 38. Food stamps, however, cannot pay for clothing or hous-
ing, which are as necessary to survival as food.
120. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. The Court stated in McRae
that "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a women's exer-
cise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. In-
digency falls in the latter category." 448 U.S. at 316. See also Maher, 432 U.S. at
474.
121. For example, the federal government failed to raise the minimum wage
throughout the 1980s, allowing it to fall far below the poverty level. See ALBELDA,
ET AL., supra note 5, at 66; 1995 WORLD ALMANAC 151 (showing that minimum
wage did not increase between 1981 and 1990). Federal reserve policy directly in-
fluences unemployment rates, and the federal government often works to maintain
a minimum rate of unemployment in order to curb other economic problems such
as inflation. See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Re-
thinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 46 (1987); ALBELDA ET AL., su-
pra note 5, at 78 (finding that current Federal Reserve policy manipulates inter-
ests rates to maintain unemployment above 5%). Trade policies, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), encourage businesses to use foreign
rather than domestic labor. See, e.g., Jim Hightower, NAFTA-We Don't Hafta!
UTNE READER, July-Aug. 1993, at 97, 99 (interviewing economists who admit
NAFTA is projected to cause net job loss in the United States, and stating that
55% of corporate executives surveyed planned to shift production to Mexico). The
Government's decision to allow largely unregulated market actors to control the
distribution of health care and child care has left many parents unable to take em-
ployment even when jobs can be found.
122. Government policy during the two world wars lured workers to the city to
fill war jobs, then made little allowance for these workers after the wars. Edel-
man, supra note 121, at 45. After World War II, federal agricultural policies em-
phasized large agri-businesses over small farms, driving some farmers to the city
and leaving others trapped in rural poverty. Id. During the 1950s, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs set up a relocation program to encourage Native Americans to move
from reservations to cities, but took no responsibility for migrants thereafter. See
[Vol. 15:215244
SINGLE MOTHERS
well as in denying poor children the quality of education they need
to improve their labor market positions. 123 Federal and state gov-
ernments have designed welfare programs that defeat recipients'
efforts to escape poverty through gradual accumulation of re-
sources,1 24 with benefit levels so low as to preclude any thought of
long-term measures to improve one's situation. 125 Thus, when a
mother is placed in the position of having to give up her children
or place them in any available day care against her will, the gov-
ernment has done far more to facilitate the intrusion into her pa-
rental rights than merely failing to pay for their exercise.
126
ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 158 (3d ed. 1991). Meanwhile,
federal and state governments actively supported the growth of suburbs while
openly supporting racial segregation in housing, thereby trapping African-
Americans in inner cities while jobs followed federally-subsidized highways. See
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 20 at 17-59.
123. Edelman, supra note 121, at 45-46. Differential funding of schools in
wealthy and poor districts is but one example, as is the use of teaching and evalua-
tion methods geared toward the wealthy. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES 164, 206-10 (1991) (depicting results of differential funding);
WILLIAM RYAN, EQUALITY 121-37 (1981) (describing educational practices that per-
petuate class differences). Government also helps maintain poverty by limiting
access to higher education, e.g., through cuts in student aid; by contrast, universi-
ties in most European countries do not even charge tuition for undergraduate edu-
cation. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FINANCING HIGHER
EDUC.: CURRENT PATTERNS 38-42, 50 (1990).
124. AFDC mandates all-or-nothing dependence by reducing benefits one dollar
for every dollar recipients earn in the labor market. See supra note 2. This results
from an affirmative decision by Congress in 1981 to revoke a provision allowing
AFDC recipients to keep one-third of earned income plus $30. Edelman, supra
note 121, at 15. AFDC recipients report having food stamps reduced upon receiv-
ing financial aid for higher education and being forced to sell cars, bought during
periods of employment and necessary for finding and maintaining jobs, in order to
qualify for aid. Weiss, supra note 12, at 24.
125. On an immediate level, insufficient benefits force mothers to spend enor-
mous amounts of time obtaining necessities through charity bureaucracies, often
without benefit of cars, telephones, or child care. Weiss, supra note 12, at 24.
Furthermore, excessive costs, dangerous conditions and unscrupulous landlords
make housing particularly difficult to retain for AFDC families, most of whom do
not receive housing assistance. See infra note 182; Weiss, supra note 12, at 31-33.
Mothers spend considerable time searching for affordable housing in a market
with a shortage, then moving, searching charities for necessities abandoned for
lack of a car to move them, and dealing with school bureaucracies to continually
re-enroll their children. Weiss, supra note 12, at 31-33. As a result, very little en-
ergy remains for education or training, and those mothers who do enroll in train-
ing programs often drop out when a family crisis arises to take priority. Id. at 30-
36. The federal government's virtual abandonment of its housing programs during
the 1980s exacerbated these problems. Federal funds for low-income housing were
cut by over 80% during the decade. See Children's Defense Fund, Homeless Fami-
lies and Children: Key Facts (1990) (unpublished, on file with author).
126. Peter Edelman takes a different approach in proposing a right to subsis-
tence, arguing that the government's creation of a class of long-term poor amounts
to differential treatment of this group under the Equal Protection Clause. Edel-
man, supra note 121, at 43, 46-48. He admits, however, that the Supreme Court's
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The strongest factor distinguishing Maher and McRae from
the case of welfare time limits and benefit denials, however, is that
as long as SI exists, there is no longer a question of whether the
government should subsidize the exercise of the parental rights at
issue. The federal government has already allocated funding for
the right to choose one's own parenting style to one group of single
mothers.127 A long line of cases holds that if government does
choose to provide a benefit, it may not allocate it in a discrimina-
tory manner even if it had no obligation to provide the benefit in
the first place.12 8 Under these circumstances, the question be-
requirement of proof of discriminatory intent would be difficult to overcome. Id.
Edelman observes that a number of other government actions have contributed, in
a more subtle way, to the problem of poverty, noting various issues in the struc-
ture of corporate, contract and criminal law. Id. at 44-45.
127. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
128. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
(1995) (barring state university from denying religious publication access to gen-
eral funding for student publications); Lamb's Chapel v. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (preventing school district from excluding a religious
group where non-religious groups were allowed to discuss the same subject); Wid-
mar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 262 (1981) (preventing state university from excluding a
student religious group from campus facilities available to other student groups);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (preventing government from denying
AFDC benefits for unemployed fathers in two parent families to unemployed
mothers); Graham v. Richarson, 403 U.S. 365 (1973) (preventing denial of AFDC to
resident aliens); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (barring state from de-
nying unemployment compensation to an applicant who left job for religious rea-
sons); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring state to provide legal
counsel to poor in criminal appeals to avoid excluding indigent from generally
available appellate review); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)
(preventing state from denying general tax exemption to individuals who refused
to sign loyalty pledge); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (striking state filing
fees for criminal appeals that effectively excluded indigent from benefit generally
available to other accused).
These cases demonstrate that all constitutional limitations, whether equal
protection, free exercise, free speech or due process, apply to the distribution of
government benefits not required by the Constitution itself. The Court specifically
denied the ability of the government to discriminate in the AFDC context in West-
cott, 443 U.S. at 85 (rejecting the notion "that welfare benefits are a 'privilege' not
subject to the guarantee of equal protection"), and Graham, 403 U.S. at 374, 375
(stating that equal protection does not turn on description of benefit as "right" or
"privilege," and state's conservation of welfare budget does not justify invidious
discrimination).
This is related to, but distinct from, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions, which states that government cannot place a condition on a benefit so as to
penalize the exercise of a fundamental right. See, e.g., Sherbert, supra
(invalidating denial of unemployment insurance to Seventh-Day Adventist who
refused to work on Saturday for religious reasons since the benefit was conditioned
on giving up right to religious expression); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (striking welfare residency requirements which forced choice between wel-
fare and right to travel). The Supreme Court has never consistently applied the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and in some cases, has weakened it. See, e.g.,
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding law conditioning Medicaid on not
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comes not whether the government must subsidize the right, but
for whom it chooses to do so.
III. The Equal Protection Clause and Discrimination
Among Single Parents
A. Equal Protection Case Law
In the hypothetical example of the Andersons and Browns
above, 129 the death of a deadbeat father proved the saving grace of
the Anderson family. Because the federal government distin-
guishes among classes of single mothers and children based purely
on their former relationship to a man, Phyllis Brown lost her
means of support, her home and, ultimately, her children.130 This
section surveys the Supreme Court case law under which Mrs.
Brown and her children must argue for the unconstitutionality of
this distinction.
The distinction between SI and AFDC received some consti-
tutional support from two Supreme Court decisions, but both are
easily distinguished from the case of AFDC cutoffs. In Califalw v.
Boles,'31 a five-Justice majority upheld the rule limiting adult eli-
gibility for SI to widows and surviving divorced spouses. The de-
ceased worker in Boles had fathered a child out of wedlock; the
child qualified for benefits, but his mother did not. 132 Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that, although the original purpose of SI was
"to permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to
care of children . . . "13 the benefit to children of the mother's re-
ceipt of SI was "incidental" because the mother's benefits are
"distinct" from the children's benefits. 34 The relevant distinction
was thus between classes of mothers, not of children born in or out
exercising right to abortion); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971)
(upholding rule conditioning AFDC on allowing caseworker to visit home, poten-
tially violating Fourth Amendment). For an excellent analysis of this issue, see
Bogle, supra note 4, at 196-12.
A court would likely hold that time limits avoid the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine because they are not an explicit condition or a specific exclusion
based on exercise of a right. The benefit is simply defined as temporary, and re-
ceipt in no way depends on whether or how a mother chooses to exercise her pa-
rental rights. The important issue is that other single mothers do not have to
worry about the temporary nature of their benefits.
129. See supra Part I.
130. Id.
131. 433 U.S. 282 (1979).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 288 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
134. Id. at 294.
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of wedlock, therefore requiring only rational basis review. 135
Rehnquist found the limitation to widows and divorced women ra-
tional in light of the statute's purpose of "provid[ing] persons de-
pendent on the wage earner with protection against the economic
hardship occasioned by the loss of the wage earner's support."'136
In deciding how to fulfill this purpose, Congress could rationally
conclude that widows and divorced women were more likely to be
dependent on the father of their children than women who had
never been married. 137 Rehnquist brushed aside the fact that di-
vorced women could qualify whether or not their husband had ever
supported them, finding rationality even though the legislative
change that allowed divorced women to collect with no showing of
support had been an "incidental" byproduct of legislation meant to
help older widows. 138
Boles itself sets out some of the factors that distinguish it
from the case of welfare cutoffs. The Court felt no need to examine
the distinction between children born in and out of wedlock be-
135. Statutes that classify children according to their birth in or out of wedlock
were, for several years, reviewed under a higher standard before Boles. See, e.g.,
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating law denying
workmen's compensation to worker's out-of-wedlock children). The Court, how-
ever, did not agree on a standard of review for such classifications until 1988. See
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (stating that "legitimacy" classifications are
reviewed under heightened judicial scrutiny).
136. Boles, 443 U.S. at 288 (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 50 (1977)
(citing Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1976)).
137. Id. at 288-92.
138. Id. at 291-92. Congress dropped the support requirement for the benefit of
older women divorced after 20 years or more as a housewife who often found it
difficult to reenter the labor market. Id. Under previous Social Security rules,
such women had to demonstrate that they received support from their husbands;
this disqualified women in states that did not allow alimony or women who had
accepted property settlements in lieu of alimony. Id. Accordingly, Congress
dropped the support requirement, retaining a requirement that widows without
children have been married to their husbands for 20 years (now reduced to 10). Id.
Mothers of SI-eligible children had never been subject to the marriage duration
requirement, and such mothers were "not even mentioned" in the committee re-
ports on the 1972 amendment. Id. at 292 n.9; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 402 (g)(1)
(West 1994) (granting eligibility for SI to "[tihe surviving divorced spouse and
every surviving divorced parent ... of an individual who died a fully or currently
insured individual .... "). 42 U.S.C. § 416(d)(2) defines "surviving divorced wife"
as "a woman who is divorced from an individual who had died, but only if she had
been married to the individual for a period of 10 years immediately before the date
that divorce became effective." By contrast, 42 U.S.C. § 416(d)(7) defines
"surviving divorced parent" as equivalent to either a "surviving divorced mother"
or "surviving divorced father" as defined in previous subsections; 42 U.S.C. § 416
(d)(3) defines "surviving divorced mother" as "a woman divorced from an individual
who has died, but only if ... she is the mother of his son or daughter" by birth or
adoption. Thus, there is no durational marriage requirement for SI as long as
there is a dependent child.
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cause the classification, in its view, lacked a "substantial disparate
impact" on a particular group of children.139 To make such a claim,
"it is necessary to show that the class which is purportedly dis-
criminated against consequently suffers significant deprivation of
a benefit or imposition of a substantial burden."'140 One could
hardly argue that children deprived of the very means of survival,
based solely on whether their father is alive or dead, are not
"substantially" impacted or "significantly" burdened.' 4 ' Moreover,
whatever the relation of the benefit scheme to its original purpose,
welfare time limits function to determine which parents risk losing
their fundamental right to custody of their children.1
42
139. Boles, 443 U.S. at 294.
140. Id. at 295.
141. One can gain some insight into the likely circumstances of single-parent
families deprived of government aid by looking at the situations of two-parent
families with no wage earner before the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485, 102 Stat, 2343, when such families could receive AFDC in only a handful
of states. Journalists and photographers documenting the growth of homelessness
in the 1980s frequently noted two-parent families living in cars or in campgrounds.
See, e.g., DALE MAHARIDGE, JOURNEY TO NOWHERE 112-17, 162-64 (2d ed. 1996)
(1982 account originally published 1985); STEPHEN SHAMES, OUTSIDE THE DREAM
28-31 (1991) (photos 1985); JIM HUBBARD, AMERICAN REFUGEES 64-67 (1991)
(photos 1988-89). Single mothers may end up even worse off than these families,
particularly after five years in the enforced poverty of AFDC, because they may be
less likely to own cars or tents at the time of loss of housing.
Journalist Maharidge interviewed an unemployed construction worker whose
family at the time was living out of a 1966 Chevrolet and seeking work picking
fruit. Maharidge, supra, at 162. The father reported that the family had survived
the previous winter by eating out of dumpsters, with the result that one of the
children became seriously ill. Id. (The father, who was illiterate, had not applied
for welfare due to the "hassle." Id.) Another Maharidge book contains photographs
of three children who lived in a hobo camp near Sacramento for several weeks in
1989 with their mother and father, an unemployed lumberman from the Pacific
Northwest; the children are pictured unwashed, barefoot and without jackets in a
time period identified as February or March. DALE MAHARIDGE, THE LAST GREAT
AMERICAN HOBO 31, 140-45 (1993) (photos 1989).
142. Apparently, no argument was made in Boles that the right to choose to stay
home with one's children was fundamental. Also, despite all the Court's talk about
how programs as large as Social Security do not need to "filte[r] out those, and
only those, who are in the factual position which generated the congressional con-
cern reflected in the statute," Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975), the
rationality of Congress' current set of distinctions among mothers is open to debate
(and has not been fully litigated). See infra Parts III.B and III.C. Rehnquist em-
phasized in Boles that Congress intended Social Security to remain a "contributory
insurance plan" and that "general welfare objectives are addressed through public
assistance legislation." Boles, 443 U.S. at 296. Courts should be less willing to
allow such a sloppy definition of rationality when such a safety net, for many
women and children, will no longer exist. See infra note 246 for a discussion of the
myth of the "contributory" nature of Social Security.
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The Supreme Court upheld disparities in benefit levels be-
tween AFDC and Social Security in Jefferson v. Hackney,143 but
that case only discussed differences in the amount of aid to the
aged, the disabled and AFDC families. If the parties brought up
the similarity between AFDC and SI recipients, it was not men-
tioned in Justice Rehnquest's opinion. Once again, the case dealt
only with the difference between more and less money, not with
whether a group, e.g., those affected by welfare time limits, was to
be cut off with no means of support whatsoever. 144
The Court in Jefferson rejected the contention that differ-
ences between AFDC and Social Security reflected bias against the
greater non-white population receiving AFDC, eliminating one of
the two bases for strict judicial scrutiny. 145 The second basis, a
143. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). The state granted the aged 100% of its calculated
standard of need and the disabled 95%, but AFDC families only 75%. Id. at 537
n.3.
144. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
145. Several years after Jefferson, the Court placed the burden on plaintiffs to
prove intent to discriminate on the basis of race in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977).
Although the Court denied the significance of the racial disparities between
AFDC and SI, Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 545-49, the disparities go a long way toward
explaining the disparate treatment. Both AFDC and Social Security were origi-
nally restricted to whites, Social Security by excluding from coverage jobs most
commonly held by African-Americans and AFDC by discriminatory application of
"suitable home" requirements. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 5, 45-46. The mod-
ern conservative attack on "welfare" began at the same time as availability of legal
services for the poor increased and liberal courts struck down AFDC restrictions,
with the result that large numbers of impoverished African-Americans were finally
able to receive AFDC. Id. at 5; see also JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE
117-34 (1994).
Many rightist "welfare" commentators are explicit in their racism. Charles
Murray, who popularized the notion of abolishing AFDC in 1984 in Losing Ground,
also argues in The Bell Curve that blacks are less intelligent than whites.
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CuRvE 276-95, 301-15
(1994) (claiming neither environment nor test bias explains IQ differences between
whites and African-Americans); id. at 22-23 (accepting IQ as a measure of intelli-
gence); id. at 317-40 (explaining black-white social inequalities in terms of IQ).
"Workfare" advocate Mickey Kaus defends his draconian proposals by describing
AFDC recipients as an "underclass"; he then claims that "[i]t's simply stupid to
pretend that the underclass is not mainly black," and that he would not want his
children attending school with "welfare children." MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF
EQUALITY 106, 108-09 (1993).
African-Americans are overrepresented on AFDC, comprising 37.3% of recipi-
ents; 39% are non-Hispanic white. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 410.
The Green Book does not give racial data for Social Security recipients, highlight-
ing the racialized nature of AFDC discussion. See id. at 34-37. African-Americans
are likely to be underrepresented on Social Security, compared to their shares of
the population, because they often have less consistent work histories. See id. at
1096 (showing African-Americans to be unemployed at twice the rate of whites).
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fundamental interest at stake, could not apply because a previous
case had denied the fundamental right to welfare aid.146 Interme-
diate judicial scrutiny, in which a classification must be
"substantially" related to an "important" state interest,147 applies
in the presence of "certain forms of legislative classification,
[which] while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recur-
ring constitutional difficulties."'148 This standard has normally
been applied to classifications based on gender or out-of-wedlock
childbirth. 49 While one of the stated aims of proponents of puni-
tive welfare "reform" is to discourage "illegitimacy,"'150 the time
limits do not distinguish between children born in and out of wed-
lock. The Court generally relies on distinctions stated on the face
of laws, 51 although in one case, it invalidated a regulation that
discriminated by family type as a thinly disguised "illegitimacy"
classification. 15 2
As noted, AFDC was designed to allow a certain subclass of white single
mothers to stay home with their children. See supra note 2. Historically, very few
African-American mothers have had the luxury to parent their children full-time,
and those who did where apt to be accused of laziness as early as the post-Civil
war period. See COONTZ, supra note 90, at 239-41. That the recent attack on
AFDC began when it extended to African-Americans for the first time implies that
many Americans prefer the nineteenth century ideal of the white woman working
in her own kitchen and the black woman working in somebody else's; this in turn
reflects society's unwillingness to recognize the equal rights of African-American
parents and the equal needs of African-American children. See generally Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1994).
146. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (holding that the Constitu-
tion guarantees welfare recipients only procedural safeguards). See infra Part
III.B for an equal protection analysis incorporating the theory of fundamental
rights detailed in Part 1.
147. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
148. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
149. The Court established the intermediate scrutiny standard of review for
"illegitimacy" classifications in Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
150. The Act lists among its purposes the "prevent(ion] and reduc[tion ofl the
incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish[ment of] annual numerical
goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies." Pub. L. No.
104-193, sec 103, § 401(a)(3). Its "findings" section includes a panoply of statistics
about the alleged ill effects of single parenthood, occasionally distinguishing be-
tween children of divorce and children born out-of-wedlock (never addressing any
other factors), and concluding that it is "the sense of the Congress that prevention
of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out of wedlock birth are very impor-
tant Government interests and the policy contained in part A of title IV of the So-
cial Security Act (as amended by section 103(a) of this Act) is intended to address
the crisis." Id. sec. 101(10).
151. See, e.g., Personnel Admin. of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979) (requiring proof of intent to discriminate against women where distinction
on face of statute was between veterans and non-veterans).
152. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973)
(holding that equal protection is denied when benefits for poor families are denied
to children born out of wedlock). The New Jersey program at issue gave extra
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Where a fundamental right or traditionally suspect classifica-
tion is lacking, the Court reviews most social welfare legislation,
as well as most distinctions based on household type, under ra-
tional basis review. 153 Although it is technically a single test-
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest-rational basis
review has been applied in two ways. In some cases, the Court
adopts an extremely deferential test, essentially upholding any
regulation for which it can imagine a reason.15 4 In other cases,
however, the Court applied a substantive rational basis test by ex-
amining the fit between the stated purpose and effect of a classifi-
cation, often taking into account the interests of those whom the
classification disadvantages. 155
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,156 the
Court struck down a rule denying food stamps to households con-
tainig unrelated individuals. The law's author had intended it to
benefits to working poor households "composed of two adults of the opposite sex
ceremonially married to each other who have at least one minor child.., of both,
the natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a child adopted by both." Id.
at 619 (citation omitted). Thus, the law denied benefits to children born to unmar-
ried parents unless the children had been adopted by their stepparents or a mar-
ried couple, or unless the children's parents married after the children's birth.
153. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that "[cilose
relatives are not a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class" and that a regulation must
'directly and substantially' interfere with family living arrangements" in order to
burden a fundamental right). The Court used rational basis review to uphold the
food stamp program's definition of "household," which counted parents, children
and siblings living together as single households while groups of more distant rela-
tives counted as separate households unless they bought and prepared food to-
gether. Id. at 643.
154. For example, the Court used this form of rational basis review to uphold
varying benefit levels for the elderly, the disabled and AFDC families. See Jeffer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court wrote:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some reasonable basis, it does
not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some ine-
quality' .... 'A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.'
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (citations omitted).
155. See e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating a state consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting antidiscrimination ordinances from protecting
gays and lesbians); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(striking down a city ordinance requiring a special permit to build a group home
for the mentally retarded); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating a state
law denying public education to children of illegal immigrants); United States
Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down a rule which denied
food stamps to households containing unrelated individuals); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons).
156. 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
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deny food stamps to "hippies" and "hippie communes,"'157 but as
Justice Brennan wrote for the majority, "if the constitutional con-
ception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a po-
litically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest."'158 While "hippies" could evade the law by buying
and preparing food separately, "AFDC mothers who try to raise
their standard of living by sharing housing" were losing their eli-
gibility. 59 Thus, in practice, the law was overbroad and did not
affect the group of persons it was meant to reach.
The Court in Moreno invalidated the law on rational basis
grounds without reaching the issue of whether it infringed on
rights of privacy and association. 60 It took a similar approach in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,'6' invalidating on rational basis grounds a
state law making it a felony to distribute contraceptives to unmar-
ried individuals while explicitly avoiding a decision on the extent
of privacy rights. 62 Justice Brennan wrote that if access to con-
traception was a fundamental right, it derived from inherent indi-
vidual privacy rights which could not be restricted by marital
status. Conversely, even if distribution of contraceptives was an
"evil" the state could bar, the evil was identical for married and
unmarried persons, so exempting married couples solely based on
their marital status was irrational. 163 The significance of Eisen-
stadt to the AFDC/SI distinction is that classifications based on
marital status must have a rational basis beyond merely deifying
the marriage relationship. 164
157. Id. at 537.
158. Id. at 534.
159. Id. at 537 (quoting the explanation proffered by the California Director of
Social Welfare).
160. Id. at 528.
161. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
162. Id. at 447 n.7 (concluding that if the statute "impinge[d] upon fundamental
freedoms ... the statutory classification would have to be not merely rationally
related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the achievement of a compelling
state interest," but concluding that the law failed to satisfy even the more lenient
rational basis standard) (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 453-54. The Court noted that although a single person could not
purchase contraceptives for use in premarital sex, a married person could legally
use them for adultery. Id. at 449.
164. Thus, the law presuming that a mother's husband is the father of her child
promotes interests in administrative convenience and in the integrity of the ex-
isting family unit. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989). See
also supra note 61. Differential tax classifications of married couples and unmar-
ried individuals may also serve valid administrative interests. See, e.g., 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 1(a), l(c) (West 1994) (establishing different income tax structures for
married couples and unmarried individuals).
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While Eisenstadt and Moreno arguably involved privacy
rights, the Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center165
applied substantive rational basis review to a pure equal protec-
tion claim. Cleburne invalidated a zoning provision which re-
quired a special use permit for a group home for mentally retarded
persons; the city did not require such a permit for a boarding or
fraternity house with the same number of residents. 166 Justice
White explicitly denied that mental retardation was a "quasi-
suspect" classification calling for heightened scrutiny, but found
that none of the city's reasons justified singling out the mentally
retarded except for the unsubstantiated fears of local property
owners.16 7 Justice White responded that "[p]rivate biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indi-
rectly, give them effect."'168 In other words, even rational basis re-
view does not allow disadvantaging a group for its own sake.
The Court explicitly reaffirmed this idea in Romer v.
Evans,169 which invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment
denying gays and lesbians coverage under any anti-discrimination
statute, regulation, or ordinance in the state. The Court regarded
the "sheer breadth" of the disability imposed by the amendment,
170
"divorced from any factual context," as evidence that it was "a clas-
sification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit."171 In the process, the
Court noted that even though it had previously upheld statutes
with tenuous justifications, to survive rational basis review a stat-
The Supreme Court has not heard challenges to laws criminalizing adultery
and sex between unmarried people following Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438, but has
implied such laws' constitutionality in dicta on grounds of state interests in pro-
moting commonly accepted notions of morality. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 195-96 (1986). The marital status distinction differentiating AFDC from SI,
however, does not serve similar purposes; no morality distinction can be made be-
tween the conditions of having a living or a dead ex-husband.
165. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 442-47. Race, alienage, religion and national origin are "suspect
classifications" under the Constitution because they are "so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considera-
tions are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy." Id. at 440. Laws that distin-
guish on these grounds are subject to "strict judicial scrutiny," meaning that to
survive an Equal Protection challenge, they much be "narrowly tailored" to the
achievement of a "compelling" state interest. See supra note 139-46 and accompa-
nying text. Other classifications, such as those based on gender and out-of-
wedlock birth, are "quasi-suspect' and subjected to somewhat less strict standards.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
169. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
170. Id. at 1627.
171. Id. at 1629.
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ute must be "narrow enough in scope and grounded in sufficient
factual context for us to ascertain that there existed some relation
between the classification and the purpose it served."
172
The Court used similar justifications and techniques in Plyler
v. Doe,173 which invalidated a Texas law excluding illegal alien
children from public education. The Court had previously declared
education not to be a fundamental right,174 and illegal immigrants
could not be a suspect class because their very presence in this
country was a crime. Children of illegal immigrants, however, like
children born out of wedlock, could "affect neither their parents'
conduct nor their own status."' 75 Moreover, denial of education led
to the possibility of creating an illiterate "underclass" which has
the potential to become a great burden on society. Because of the
"costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its vic-
tims,"176 the Court proceeded from a "presumption that denial of
education to innocent children is not a rational response to legiti-
mate state concerns."177 Justice Brennan's majority opinion then
invalidated the law by illustrating the lack of congruence between
the policy and the states' asserted reasons.
78
Much of Justice Brennan's reasoning in Plyler applies to the
case of time limits on AFDC. Justice Brennan wrote that in evalu-
ating the rationality of a policy, "[w]e cannot ignore the significant
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the
means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order
rests."'179 Brennan had previously written the Roberts v. United
States Jaycees opinion highlighting the key role of parental asso-
ciation in transmitting these values.180 Also significantly, as the
Browns' hypothetical indicates, under time-limited welfare, chil-
dren whose parents cannot find employment and who are not re-
moved from their homes by the state will frequently be unable to
172. Id. at 1627.
173. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
174. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
175. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770
(1977)).
176. Id. at 224.
177. Id. at 224 n.21. This presumption reversed the usual allocation of the bur-
den of proof in rational basis review, in which "those attacking the rationality of
the legislative classification have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it."' F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
314-15 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
364 (1973)).
178. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
179. Id. at 221.
180. 468 U.S. 609, 617-20 (1984).
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attend school. Despite some progress in educating homeless chil-
dren, most school districts use fixed addresses in determining resi-
dence, and also require that children have certain articles of
clothing, such as shoes.' 8 ' Because most AFDC dollars are used
for housing, 182 benefit cutoffs will throw large numbers of children
into a transient lifestyle making educational continuity, if not at-
tendance, impossible.
Justice Brennan concluded in Plyler that "[i]f the State is to
deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public educa-
tion that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that
denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some sub-
stantial state interest."8 3 The Court in other contexts has treated
complete denial of AFDC benefits with the same solicitude as de-
nial of education, 184 and like the law in Plyler, AFDC cutoffs com-
pletely deny these basic necessities to a discrete group of children
as a method of punishing their parents. 8 5 The rationality of the
181. See supra note 40. Anecdotal accounts reveal more subtle barriers to the
education of extremely poor children. In one reported incident in California, it
took a year to convince the local school board to create a school bus stop at a state
park in which twelve homeless families with 35 children lived more or less perma-
nently. SHAMES, supra note 141, at 31. In another, children who lived in a New
York "welfare hotel" after leaving an abusive father were unable to bathe regularly
because their bathtub (as well as the toilet) was stopped for months at a time; they
frequently missed school due to embarrassment at their uncleanliness. Id. at 66.
182. Of 13.8 million renter households with incomes low enough to qualify for
federal housing assistance, nearly 10 million receive no assistance at all. ALBELDA
ET AL., supra note 5, at 39. As of 1987, "only 29 percent of poor renter households
received any type of federal, state or local housing subsidy." MICHAEL SHERRADEN,
ASSETS AND THE POOR 245 (1991). In Minnesota, only one in three AFDC families
received a housing subsidy in 1991. Minnesota AFDC Grants Don't Meet Chil-
dren's Basic Needs, YOU SHOULD KNOW... (Children's Defense Fund-Minnesota),
Mar. 1991, at 1. In 1991, the average monthly cost of a "decent" one-bedroom
apartment in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area was 4% more than the
entire AFDC grant for a family of two. Id. Nationally, in 1990, roughly half of all
poor renters spent over 70% of their income for housing. Children's Defense Fund,
supra note 125, at 1.
183. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
184. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (mandating procedural due
process such as a prior hearing before cutting off benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating durational residency requirements for AFDC).
185. Plyler could be read to create an entirely separate Equal Protection claim
against punitive welfare reforms: AFDC time limits discriminate among groups of
children based on their parents' characteristics in a way that appears likely to
relegate them to a subordinate caste. Although the deprivation of education here
is more attenuated than in Plyler, it is aggravated by the loss of access to any kind
of permanent housing and the effects of malnutrition. See supra notes 40, 181.
The effects of extreme poverty on children's life chances are easy to document em-
pirically. For summaries, see NATIONAL CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, FIVE
MILLION CHILDREN: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF OUR POOREST YOUNG CITIZENS
(1990); ZIGLER & STEVENSON, supra note 37, at 12, 406-08, 484-85 (1993). These
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state's asserted interests will be examined in the following sec-
tions.
B. The Unconstitutionality of AFDC Cutoffs: Fundamental
Rights Analysis
The standard under which a court will review AFDC time
limits, and the elimination of the individual entitlement to AFDC
while SI remains an entitlement, depends on whether a court ac-
cepts that the fundamental rights of parents encompass a right to
choose to raise children full-time in lieu of paid employment. If
the court finds that no fundamental right exists, the difference in
treatment between recipients of AFDC and SI will likely receive
rational basis review.' 86 If the right to choose the balance between
parental supervision and day care for one's own children is held to
follow from case law, however, the review of its selective depriva-
tion may come under one of two specialized standards: either the
strict scrutiny standard for impositions on parental rights from
Wisconsin v. Yoder 187 or the "undue burden" standard for privacy
rights in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,88 which may have super-
seded it. 189
effects should create a presumption against the laws. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227-30.
The Supreme Court distinguished the "unique circumstances" of Plyler in
Kadrmnas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 460 (1988), in which it upheld a
user fee for school for busing. The opinion noted that the user fee did not have the
direct effect of creating an educational underclass, as with the absolute denial of
education in Plyler, although the Court took pains to point out that state law al-
lowed the fee to be waived. Id. at 459-60. In the case of time limits, there is no
provision for mercy except the capped hardship and domestic abuse exemptions,
nor is there any requirement that all families receive some form of assistance in
the absence of an entitlement to cash aid. See supra note 5. The Kadrmas Court
also distinguished Plyler on the ground that the user fee did not punish children
for their parents' illegal conduct, as did the Plyler alienage distinction. Id. at 459.
Welfare cutoffs, by contrast, punish children on the basis of a parental characteris-
tic-long-term poverty-which is not even a crime. Despite the Kadrinas Court's
apparent desire to limit the substantive holding of Plyler to its facts, the Court has
since not directly weakened the Plyler method of heightened rational basis review.
186. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) ("If a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legis-
lative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.").
187. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
188. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
189. Neither of these standards have been applied in the equal protection con-
text, nor, indeed, in any context beyond the decisions that established them. It is
possible that a court would instead apply the traditional strict scrutiny analysis
used in equal protection cases involving other fundamental rights such as voting
and criminal due process. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to
vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel). This is par-
ticularly likely if the court challenge revolves around a women's loss of custody of
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Yoder involved a First Amendment religious free exercise
claim, but Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion relied on paren-
tal rights precedent to formulate its test: "[Tihe power of the par-
ent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to
limitation. . . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant
social burdens."'190 Burger clarified the test somewhat by distin-
guishing Yoder from Prince v. Massachusetts,191 which upheld the
conviction of a Jehovah's Witness under child labor laws for al-
lowing a niece in her care to distribute literature: "This case ... is
not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the
child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been
demonstrated or may be properly inferred."'192
Empirical evidence provides no support for the contention
that a woman's decision to stay home with her child has any ill ef-
fects on her children's mental health, and certainly no claim can be
made based on their physical health or safety. Where children's
academic test scores are used as a measure of well-being, analysts
have found that the important factor is not whether a mother
works outside the home, but whether her employment status is by
choice. 93 Meanwhile, evidence suggests that day care can have
both positive and negative effects on child development, and the
positive effects do not so clearly outweigh the negatives as to es-
tablish a clear reason to overcome parental rights. 9 4 Even schol-
ars who feel that day care per se can be beneficial agree that low-
quality care harms children's development, and that the present
system cannot assure reasonable quality care for all children.195
her children as a result of having exhausted her benefits, because the fundamental
right to custody under Stanley and Santosky, see supra notes 55-61 and accompa-
nying text, has been more definitively established than other parental rights. Be-
cause Part III.C argues that the distinction between AFDC and SI fails rational
basis review, a separate section dealing with this issue is not included.
190. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
191. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
192. Id. at 230.
193. See Sandra Scarr & Marlene Eisenberg, Child Care Research: Issues, Per-
spectives and Results, 44 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 613, 621 (1993).
194. For summaries of research on the possible effects of day care, see SELMA
FRAIBERG, EVERY CHILD'S BIRTHRIGHT (1977) (very negative); DAVID A. HAMBURG,
TODAY'S CHILDREN (1992) (generally positive); SANDRA SCARR, MOTHER
CARE/OTHER CARE (1984) (positive); Scarr & Eisenberg, supra note 193 (generally
positive); L. ALAN SROUFE & ROBERT G. COOPER, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 230-32
(1988) (generally positive); ZIGLER & STEVENSON, supra note 37 (equivocal); Jay
Belsky, The "Effects" of Infant Day Care Reconsidered, 3 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q.
235 (1988) (generally negative); K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Infant Day Care: Ma-
ligned or Malignant?, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 266 (1989) (generally positive).
195. SCARR, supra note 194, at 179-81; ZIGLER & STEVENSON, supra note 37, at
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Moreover, some parents, particularly those living in crime-
ridden neighborhoods, have legitimate reasons for wanting to su-
pervise school-aged as well as preschool children. For example,
studies of eighth-graders have shown lack of parental supervision
during after-school hours to be the most positive predictor of alco-
hol and drug abuse. 196 Latch-key status has also been associated
with lower academic performance and school attendance, residen-
tial fires (a major issue among poor families living in inadequate
housing), and teenage pregnancy resulting from after-school access
to empty houses. 197 To the extent that children in poor areas are
more likely than other children to encounter or participate in
neighborhood violence, parental supervision is more likely than
parental employment to protect their safety and the public "safety,
peace, order and welfare.' 1 98
Under the Yoder test, then, the only possible justification for
interfering in parental rights is to prevent "significant social bur-
dens."'199 Although some might characterize stay-at-home mothers
and their children as a "burden" because of the public money spent
on their support, in Yoder the term referred to the long-term bur-
dens on society that result when children do not receive educa-
tion.200 According to Yoder, Amish children who are withdrawn
from school after eighth grade would not amount to such burdens
as long as they stayed within the Amish culture. 20 1 When one
compares the social burdens of supporting mothers and children
today to those resulting in the long term from stunted develop-
ment because of poor-quality day care, latch-key related school
35, 238. Unregulated home-based day care is the least expensive variety; one 1995
study found that only 9% of such homes provided "good quality" care, while one-
third actually damaged the children's developmental progress. Sexton, supra note
36, at BI.
196. ZIGLER & STEVENSON, supra note 37, at 481.
197. Id. at 21, 481.
198. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972). Theresa Funiciello, a
former AFDC recipient and welfare rights organizer, writes that these are very
real concerns to poor single mothers in deciding whether to work outside the
home:
[T]here were many women who got off welfare to work at jobs that didn't
pay enough to change anything about their material condition. They lived
in the same neighborhoods, the same dismal apartments. I knew several
who had gotten off welfare when their children turned school age, only to
return when the children entered puberty and the local drug dealers be-
came such a menace that the mothers were willing to subject themselves
once again to the constant humiliation and limitless abuses of the welfare,
the lesser of two ghoulish evils.
FUNICIELLO, supra note 20, at 75.
199. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
200. Id. at 224.
201. Id. at 235.
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performance declines and increases in drug use and teenage preg-
nancy, one sees that the government has advanced no reason com-
pelling enough to override AFDC mothers' fundamental right to
parent.
The Yoder test has apparently not been applied since the de-
cision itself, and the Supreme Court may have replaced it with the
"undue burden" analysis of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.20 2 Casey
applied the "unique burden" test to restrictions on abortion, but
because the Court reaffirmed the right to abortion as a privacy
right related to the Meyer-Pierce line of cases,2 03 the analysis may
extend to those cases as well. In their plurality opinion, Justices
O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy stated that an "undue burden" is
imposed when a state regulation has the "purpose or effect" of
placing a "substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion.204 The language of their test makes it unlikely that time-
limited welfare or discriminatory denial of benefits to women who
are ineligible for SI could survive:
A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means cho-
sen by the State to further the interest in potential life must
be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.
And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential
life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot
be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends .... What is at stake is the woman's right to make the
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in
doing so. 205
Casey leaves the extent of the undue burden standard un-
clear; the Court used it to invalidate a rule requiring married
women to notify their husbands of their decision to have an abor-
tion, but sustained a 24-hour waiting period, despite its substan-
tial effect on poor and rural women. 20 6 If a court finds the right to
choose one's own parenting balance to be as fundamental as the
right to abortion and applies the undue burden standard, however,
it is difficult to imagine that AFDC cutoffs could be upheld under
the language above. In no sense do such cutoffs "inform" a woman
about her ultimate decision whether to work outside the home and
place her child(ren) in day care; they completely extinguish the
right to choose absent a material change in circumstances on the
202. 505 U.S. 833, 876-79 (1992).
203. Id. at 849, 853.
204. Id. at 877.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 885-87 (waiting period); id. at 887-98 (spousal notification).
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order of marriage. While the Court was unsympathetic to the
plight of the poor in sustaining the 24-hour waiting period, the
rule imposed practical hardships but did not constitute complete
legal abolition of the right for the women concerned, which is what
welfare cutoffs impose.
The government may attempt to evade responsibility for the
deprivation of rights by depicting it as a consequence of the
mother's status as a single parent, arguing that denial of aid
thereby advances a state interest in encouraging marriage.
20 7
AFDC time limits and the loss of entitlement status, however, do
not advance the interest directly enough to survive heightened
scrutiny. The prospect of the loss of the mother's parental rights is
unlikely to deter a father from abandoning a family or forcing its
breakup through abuse. In practice, moreover, the woman's right
is the same whether she is married to her partner, whether her
children are born in or out of wedlock, and even whether or not her
partner is a man. In other words, the right to choose one's own
parenting balance is not allocated based on a requisite measurable
level of traditional family values, but merely according to whether
the home contains another adult.20 8 Furthermore, mothers are not
the only parties affected by the state's attempts at promoting mar-
riage. Where rights of parental association are involved, there is
207. One of the Act's explicit purposes is promoting marriage. Pub. L. No. 104-
93, sec. 103, § 401(a)(2). The findings section also includes considerable rhetoric
about the importance of marriage to society. Id. sec. 101(1)-(2).
The mother's economic status is also a necessary factor in the government's
argument. As noted supra notes 120-25, the government is not innocent in the
creation of poverty. Whatever their theoretical cause, however, the government's
actions in practice amount to a unique deprivation of rights that, according to the
Court, predate the Constitution itself. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
If these facts were held to constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poses, the government would also carry the burden of demonstrating a
"compelling" reason why it is more important for single mothers to work outside
the home than mothers supported by their husbands. See, e.g., Carey v. Popula-
tion Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (finding that regulation burdening fun-
damental right may be justified only by compelling state interests). Eisenstadt v.
Baird implies that distinctions based on marital status can rarely survive even
rational basis review, and also establishes that Fourteenth Amendment privacy
rights exist in the individual, not in the marital relationship. 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972). The parental rights case law also defeats any claim of marriage as a pre-
requisite to the right. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (upholding
the parental rights of an unwed father); see also Part II.A and text accompanying
notes 61-62 (discussing cases involving the rights of non-custodial fathers in adop-
tions).
208. The deprivation of this right is also insufficiently tailored to promote "work
ethics," since the right is the same whether the mother's partner's means of sup-




no functional difference in the needs of children in single-parent
and two-parent families. In the words of Justice Douglas: "The
fights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship be-
tween a child and his own mother.... Why should the illegitimate
child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of wed-
lock?" 209
The justification of promoting marriage is also defeated by
the central premise of this article: within the class of single moth-
ers, the government draws a distinction between single mothers as
a whole and those eligible for SI. This privileged class comprises
widows and surviving divorced ex-spouses of a deceased worker
who have children under sixteen in the home who are eligible for
benefits.210 The government also privileges a class of children of
single mothers comprised of those whose father has at some point
died.211 If the court agrees that fundamental rights, of parents or
children, are at stake, the government will have to demonstrate
that this distinction is a narrowly tailored means to advance a
compelling state interest.2 2 The state will not meet this burden,
because the distinction between SI and AFDC recipients is so arbi-
trary as to render it doubtful that the government can even dem-
onstrate a rational basis for it.
209. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (invalidating a state statute de-
nying children born out of wedlock the right to recover for the mother's wrongful
death).
210. Children are eligible until age 18 or beyond if they are still in secondary
school or disabled. 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 5-6. Widows and stepchil-
dren must have lived with the deceased husband for at least, respectively, one year
and nine months prior to his death. 42 U.S.C.A. 416(b)(2), (e)(2) (West 1994). In
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 -(1975), the Supreme Court upheld this rule as
rational in light of its purpose of preventing women from entering into "sham mar-
riages" for the purpose of collecting benefits on her husband's imminent death. Id.
at 779-81. See supra note 18 for other eligibility requirements.
That not all widows and surviving divorced spouses are eligible for SI, because
some husbands are not covered by Social Security, may appear to diminish the
usefulness of the equal protection claim for the poorest of AFDC recipients. A
court could possibly order that SI be extended only to divorced spouses of workers
eligible for Social Security, or that the time limit statute be enjoined only with re-
spect to that population. This solution, however, would preserve the basic irra-
tionality of the original claim because it would still classify women and children
based solely on the characteristics of their husbands and fathers.
211. See supra note 18.
212. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
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C. The Unconstitutionality of AFDC Cutoffs: Rational
Basis Analysis
If the court does not find a fundamental right at stake, it will
decide the equal protection issue under rational basis review.
213
As noted above, this review has tended to take two forms. Al-
though several welfare-related precedents applied a toothless, def-
erential standard, 214 the case of AFDC time limits and loss of enti-
tlement has many features in common with those cases which used
the more substantial standard and actually examined the relation-
ship of the challenged regulation to the state's asserted inter-
ests.215 First of all, unlike the cases that have upheld variations in
benefit levels 216 but like several cases where restrictions on bene-
fits have been invalidated,217 the regulation at issue involves an
absolute deprivation, as opposed to a mere reduction, of "welfare
aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the
very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of
life."2 18 Second, like the regulation in Moreo 219 and Eisenstadt v.
213. As a threshold issue, the government may argue that rational basis review
eliminates the equal protection problem by requiring the SI eligibility standards to
be read in isolation from the welfare bill, on the principle that "it is no require-
ment of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or not at
all." Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). This
kind of formalistic approach is absurd on a policy level because government could
then justify virtually any classification by separating the categories into separate
statutes. The law invalidated in Plyler, for example, would have been legal as long
as it was separate from the statute authorizing public education in Texas. Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating state law barring children of illegal aliens
from public schools).
The Supreme Court has often looked at laws in the context of the complete
statutory scheme when applying heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (striking electoral scheme which left true power in hands of
white-only organization). In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592-93
(1995), the Court stressed the "irrationality" of a statute prohibiting display of al-
cohol content on beer labels in the context of laws requiring such display for other
forms of liquor, although the Court did apply heightened scrutiny because of the
commercial speech aspect of the case. Id. at 1589. In the prototypical rational ba-
sis case of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970), the Court used the
context of other statutes to bolster its finding of rationality.
214. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding disparities
in amounts paid to the elderly, disabled and families on AFDC); Dandridge, 397
U.S. at 471 (upholding maximum grant regardless of family size).
215. See supra note 153.
216. See supra note 214.
217. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 1969) (invalidating a one-year
residency requirement for AFDC); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (striking
down a regulation which allowed benefits to be terminated for alleged fraud with-
out a prior hearing). See supra note 119 for additional cases.
218. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627. Justice Brennan, who wrote for the majority in
Shapiro, added in Goldberg that public assistance "is not mere charity, but a
means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
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Baird,220 AFDC benefit cutoffs implicate concerns related to rights
of privacy and association, even if not explicitly covered under the
case law. Third, like the law overturned in Plyler,221 time limits
and selective denials of entitlement discriminate among children
who have no control over their status or their parents' behavior.
Fourth, also like the Plyler rule, these welfare "reforms" will po-
tentially relegate those children who come out on the wrong end of
the distinction to an underclass status likely (although with
slightly less certainty than the denial of education in Plyler) to
significantly impact their chances of reaching their full potential,
and will produce major burdens on society through. charity and
crime .222
The state will likely assert interests in two categories: rea-
sons for burdening AFDC recipients and reasons for privileging SI
recipients. The reasons advanced for imposing special burdens on
AFDC recipients are the same as those given for welfare "reforms"
in general, and amount to variations on three themes: (1) discour-
aging unwed childbirth and single parenthood, (2) saving money,
and (3) discouraging long-term "dependency" on government bene-
fits, both as a cost-saving measure and to inculcate a "work ethic"
in parents and children. 223
None of these justifications explain why the state should
privilege one group of single mothers above the rest. The statutory
scheme can hardly relate to deterring single parenthood when di-
vorced women who voluntarily left their husbands are eligible for
SI if the husband dies afterwards, while women whose husbands
have abandoned them, and thus have as little choice in the matter
as widow, must resort to AFDC. Moreover, a large percentage of
the "voluntary" decisions of women to become single parents, at
selves and our Posterity."' Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265.
219. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
220. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
221. 457 U.S. at 202.
222. Cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.
223. The stated purpose of the cash assistance portion of the Act is:
to increase the flexibility of states in operating a program to be designed to-
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work,
and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and
reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation
and maintenance of two-parent families.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103, § 408(a)(7)(C)(II). These purposes correspond more
or less exactly with those identified in the text except for the first, which is simply
the original purpose behind AFDC. See supra note 2.
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least among the AFDC population, results from domestic abuse;224
the state can hardly claim a "legitimate interest" in deterring
these women from leaving potentially life-threatening situations.
Whatever the value of its interest in encouraging couples to marry
and discouraging divorce, the government would be hard-pressed
to explain how this interest is rationally related to distinguishing
between classes of divorced women and children based on whether
their husbands and fathers have died within five years of the di-
vorce.
The state may claim a valid interest in deterring unwed
childbirth, rather than single parenthood per se. This argument
fails when one notes that 45% of periods of AFDC receipt begin
with a divorce or separation, while only 30% begin with a birth to
an unmarried woman.225 This makes the burdened class of AFDC
recipients, like that of households excluded from food stamps in
Moreno, extremely overinclusive; the time limit would
"incidentally" affect a class of families 50% greater than the group
of families that the law was meant to target. In any event, social
science has found no support for the contention that AFDC has
any causal effect on single-parent births. 226
224. At least 45% of women and children on AFDC have suffered repeated do-
mestic abuse. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
225. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 451. The remaining AFDC spells
begin with loss of income; 9% are "other or unidentified." Most Fainilies on AFDC
Are Small, Have One Parent, supra note 3, at 1-2. In Minnesota, 58% of parents
on AFDC are currently or formerly married. Id.
Moreover, divorced or separated mothers outnumber never-married mothers
among both short-term and long-term AFDC recipients. See 1995 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 5, at 410-11. Only at the level of over 15 years of continuous AFDC re-
ceipt do never-married mothers outnumber divorced or separated mothers, com-
prising 2.2% of the AFDC population compared to 1.8%. Id. The Congressional
findings in the Act state that a higher percentage of never-married mothers than
divorced mothers "received" AFDC-"nearly 1/2' compared to "1/5"-but do not indi-
cate whether this refers to AFDC receipt at a given point in time or over a lifetime.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 101 (9)(B). The difference between these two measures is
highly significant. See supra note 5. Notably, Congress does not claim that never-
married mothers, except those who give birth as teenagers, remain on AFDC
longer than divorced mothers. If the above statistic represented point-in-time
data, this fact would likely explain it entirely.
While SI could be construed as discouraging unwed births among women who
currently receive it, because the benefit is not adjusted upward for children who do
not belong to the deceased father, no argument can be made that the time limits
on AFDC have any bearing on whether or not a woman has additional children.
See supra note 210. A five-year lifetime limit does not distinguish between a
woman with one pre-existing child and a woman who gives birth to five more
within the time of receipt or subsequently. Moreover, no evidence exists for any
correlation between AFDC benefits levels and unwed births. See infra note 226.
226. Geographical variation in AFDC levels does not produce corresponding
variations in either unwed or teenage childbirth. For example, New Jersey's
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From the child's point of view, the unwed childbirth justifica-
tion amounts to nothing more than an illegitimacy classification,
which the Supreme Court has explicitly held to violate equal pro-
tection in the context of benefits for poor families. 227 This distinc-
tion, furthermore, is both overbroad and underinclusive. 228 Chil-
dren born out of wedlock can be eligible for SI while many
"legitimate" children must resort to AFDC; similarly, many chil-
dren of divorced parents are eligible for SI, while children in a sin-
gle-parent family because of the death of their father, can end up
on AFDC. 229 Because classifications disadvantaging "illegitimate"
AFDC benefit package is 58% higher than Mississippi's, but the two states have
equal rates of single parenthood. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 42. Further-
more, Mississippi and Alabama, which have the lowest AFDC levels in the coun-
try, have some of the highest rates of teenage pregnancy and the largest AFDC
families on average. Id. at 42, 44. Other countries, such as Canada, have provided
higher benefits with far lower rates of unwed childbirth. Id. at 44.
Temporal comparisons also defeat the hypothesis that AFDC causes unwed
childbirth. The number and percentage of families headed by never-married
mothers increased more than tenfold between 1970 and 1992. See 1995 GREEN
BOOK, supra note 5, at 1111. The real value of combined AFDC and food stamp
benefits, however, peaked in 1972 and had fallen 27% by 1990. See PrVEN &
CLOWARD, supra note 2, at 372. Studies, with the notable exception of those com-
missioned by right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, have found
that New Jersey's "family caps," which deny increased aid to mothers who give
birth while on AFDC, have no effect on birth rates. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5,
at 44; JAMES CARVILLE, WE'RE RIGHT, THEY'RE WRONG 28 (1996).
Conservatives typically point to the dramatic increase in reported rates of sin-
gle parenthood since the 1960s as evidence that the anti-poverty measures of that
era produced massive increases in unwed childbirth. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY,
LOSING GROUND 124-34 (1984). However, much of the change can be attributed to
the public repression of the fact of single motherhood from the 1930s to the 1950s.
See GORDON, supra note 2, at 33. Before courts struck down the restrictions that
had prevented African-Americans from receiving AFDC, black single mothers typi-
cally had little choice but to live with their parents, where they were not counted
as separate households by the census. Id. One-third of the officially recorded
growth in single parent families between 1940 and 1970 resulted from an increase
in independent living arrangements. See Piven & Cloward, supra note 29, at 55-
57. Moreover, between 1981 and 1983, the Census Bureau changed its coding pro-
cedures to identify unmarried mothers living with their parents; the recorded
number of such mothers doubled in those two years. Id. at 32. In short, the ap-
parent increase in single parenthood is largely attributable to increased public no-
tice of a previously hidden phenomenon.
227. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973)
("[T]here can be no doubt that the benefits extended under the challenged program
are as indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate children as to
those who are legitimate.").
228. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (invalidating provision as
"at once too narrow and too broad").
229. SI provides several ways that a deceased wage earner's out-of-wedlock
child could draw SI. See supra note 18. Similarly, if a mother with an out-of-
wedlock child married a wage earner at least nine months before his death, both
could draw SI even if the stepfather never adopted the child. See supra note 210.
A child of married parents whose father was too young or too inconsistently em-
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children, or subgroups thereof, must be substantially tailored to an
important state interest,230 the combination of over- and underin-
clusiveness in the AFDC/SI distinction would doom it regardless of
the value of the state's interest and regardless of whether such
sloppy tailoring could be held "rational" if applied only to par-
ents.2
31
As for the state's other interests, "a concern for the preserva-
tion of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classifica-
tion used in allocating those resources." 232  The stated interest
simply begs the question: Congress must still demonstrate some
reason for its distinction between SI and AFDC recipients beyond
"a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group."233 The
claim that eliminating long-term "dependency" on AFDC saves
money does not explain the lack of concern about long-term receipt
of SI, nor about SI eroding the "work ethics" of its recipients.
234
Conservative proponents of punitive welfare "reforms" have
developed the "work ethic" thesis to a high degree by postulating
that AFDC is responsible for creating an "underclass" of mainly
nonwhite long-term recipients, whose children continue the cycle
ployed to be fully and currently insured by SI could end up on AFDC after the fa-
ther's death. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 5.
230. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. Placing all "legitimate"
children and some born out of wedlock on the other side of a line from other
"illegitimate" children is also impermissible. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating worker's compensation rule requiring chil-
dren born out of wedlock to have been acknowledged by father in order to recover
for his injury); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (striking rule barring
"illegitimate" children from collecting Social Security as dependent of disabled fa-
ther unless he lived with, supported, or had subsequently legitimated them, or
state law permitted them to inherit).
231. SI can be distinguished from AFDC in that a never-married woman can
never draw SI for herself, but the fact that a divorced or widowed woman can end
up on either side of the line means that the distinction could not rationally be
viewed as an incentive to marry. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(g)(1) (West 1994) (limiting SI
to the "surviving spouse and every surviving divorced [spouse]" of a worker). Re-
drawing the distinction along married vs. never-married lines is still irrational be-
cause it requires two decisions to start a marriage, and the state is unlikely to in-
fluence a man's behavior by the knowledge that should he abandon his wife, or
drive her away with abuse, she could draw unlimited SI rather than five years of
AFDC.
232. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982).
233. United States Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
234. To the extent that AFDC has greater disincentives on paid employment
than SI, it is because the rules of AFDC, unlike SI, do not allow recipients to com-
bine the benefit with waged income. See supra note 2. Women on AFDC thus
have no incentive to seek labor that does not pay wages substantially greater than
AFDC grant levels, and work-related transportation and child care costs often de-




of dependency. 235 Even assuming that this argument is valid for
some, time limits and wholesale elimination of entitlements are
draconian in their overinclusion. 236 The assumption behind this
idea, moreover, have repeatedly been empirically discredited.237
Not only is most AFDC use short-term, 238 but studies have found
that only one out of five girls raised in families highly dependent
on AFDC are themselves highly dependent as adults, while 64% of
these girls did not draw AFDC at all. 239 Girls from families with
some AFDC receipt as children were more likely to draw AFDC as
adults than girls who had never received AFDC,240 but the girls
who had never received AFDC were also less likely to have grown
up poor, thus diminishing their chances of poverty in later life.241
Once again, conservatives give no explanation for exempting SI
from this analysis.
Rather than trying to explain its interest in AFDC cutoffs per
se, the government may claim that SI was designed for the narrow
purpose of minimizing the economic dislocation to a woman when
her husband dies. 242 The Supreme Court found this claim to be
"rational" in Boles, despite the statute's overinclusiveness in al-
lowing benefits to women who had received no support from their
235. See, e.g., KAUS, supra note 145; MURRAY, supra note 145. For an excellent
summary and refutation of these arguments, see KATZ, supra note 20, at 124-236
(1989). These arguments have been used in minimally modified form since the
1820s and applied to every immigrant group that had not yet assimilated with the
majority. See TRATTNER, supra note 2, at 51-53.
236. Cf. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (holding that an enactment's effects extend
irrationally far beyond advancing claimed state interests, allowing implication of
animus as motivation); Moreno, 413. U.S. at 537 (finding a law invalid as burden-
ing very large number of individuals beyond those intended to be affected).
237. Social welfare historian Michael B. Katz spends four pages recounting a
fraction of the social science evidence that refutes the scientific basis for Charles
Murray's, Losing Ground. KATZ, supra note 20, at 153-56.
238. "One out of four of all U.S. citizens experiences [AFDC] for at least a short
period in a decade. Only one out of fifty receives at least half their income from
welfare for eight years or more." FUNICIELLO, supra note 20, at 59. Moreover, "[i]f
welfare were a lifelong 'disease,' there would be as many or more teenagers on wel-
fare as children under five (because birth rates are declining)." Id. Instead, 40.8%
of children on AFDC are under age five and 73% are under twelve. Id.
239. "High" levels of dependency meant receiving AFDC for three consecutive
years during the period of study. 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 447-49.
Women from highly dependent families were not more likely to draw AFDC than
those from families with less constant AFDC receipt. Id. African-American
women from highly dependent families, moreover, were significantly less likely to
become highly dependent than white women from similar background. Id. A dif-
ferent study came up with a figure of 25% of daughters of AFDC recipients draw-
ing AFDC as adults. ALBELDA ET AL., supra note 5, at 82.
240. See 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 447-49.
241. ALBELDA ETAL., supra note 5, at 82.
242. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1979).
[Vol. 15:215
SINGLE MOTHERS
husbands since their divorce, and despite evidence that Congress
had made the distinction inadvertently. 243 At the same time, how-
ever, SI is extremely underinclusive in ignoring those women ex-
periencing economic dislocation from abandonment by their hus-
bands or those fleeing from abuse. Even recognizing the maxim
that state regulation need not solve all aspects of a problem at
once, 244 Congress has yet to advance any rational reason why
abused or abandoned women should receive only temporary and
discretionary benefits while women whose husbands have died are
entitled to collect benefits for as long as they remain single par-
ents. Congress has similarly not explained why divorced women
whose husbands have died should have greater latitude than other
single mothers in deciding how to raise their children, or how the
interest in helping some women to weather economic dislocation is
furthered by other women losing their children to the state.
From the children's viewpoint, the economic dislocation is the
same when a father abandons the family without paying child
support as when the father dies; to a child whose father dies years
after his parents have divorced, the benefits amount to nothing
more than a windfall. To be sure, Congress may be perfectly ra-
tional in determining that living fathers are more likely to pay
child support than dead ones. However, children whose mothers
never asked for or needed child support in the first place, or whose
dead fathers do in fact provide support in the form of inheritances
or life insurance policies, retain an entitlement to draw SI, while
those whose living fathers do not or cannot afford to pay child sup-
port still lose all welfare support, if they were allowed any to begin
with, after five years. An explanation that rational basis review
does not require complete precision will not likely explain to the
Brown children why they should be rendered homeless and taken
from their mother simply because their father made it to Mexico
alive .245
The government may try to justify its SI exemption by shift-
ing its focus from women and children to male workers, explaining
that SI was designed to reward work by ensuring that a worker
was secure in the knowledge that his wife and children would be
provided for if he died. 246 This argument again fails when one con-
243. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 2. But cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972)
(stating that underinclusion in remedying "evils" perceived by the state can be
"invidious").
245. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
246. Related to this issue is the contention that SI is different from AFDC be-
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siders that a divorced woman may draw SI with no indication as to
whether her husband wished to support her.247 A man who aban-
dons his wife, or abuses her until she leaves him, and then fails to
pay child support, probably does not gain much peace of mind from
the knowledge that, if he dies, his children will receive SI rather
than AFDC.
cause it is a "contributory" program in which workers "earn" benefits for their
families, while AFDC is essentially a publicly-run charity funded by "other peo-
ple's" tax dollars. This is ultimately a sexist argument resting on a failure to rec-
ognize the traditional labor of women in raising children as valid work deserving of
recognition and compensation. See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 20. By compari-
son, the state-level predecessors of AFDC were called mothers' pensions, meant as
a parallel to veterans' pensions, in recognition the service to the country that
mothers perform in childrearing. See GORDON, supra note 5, at 72.
On a practical level, this distinction is nothing more than a fiction. Social Se-
curity is a direct transfer payment program; workers do not pay into individual
insurance accounts saved up until the need strikes, but into a general fund from
which money is dispersed to the retired, the disabled and SI-eligible families. 1995
GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 2. The Social Security tax is collected separately
from general income and sales taxes, and it is far more regressive, as income above
$60,000 [1994 figure] is not taxed. Id. at 3. The difference, however, is purely a
matter of accounting.
While the amount of monthly benefits varies according to the worker's previ-
ous earnings, the total amount of money that a retiree, widow or surviving child
can draw from Social Security bears no relation to the amount paid in. See
GORDON, supra note 2, at 5; Fraser & Gordon, supra note 20, at 61. For example,
for Social Security purposes, a worker could be "fully and currently insured" if he
worked and paid into Social Security throughout the six consecutive quarters after
his 21st birthday. 1995 GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at 8. A worker can become
fully insured for life by working 40 quarters. Id. Thus, if a fully insured worker
dies at age 22 years, six months, his wife and newborn child could collect SI for 16
and 18 years respectively, as could the wife and child of a 50-year-old man who
became fully insured for life at age 31 and never worked since. In either case, the
families will collect far more than the worker ever paid in.
In any event, although the distinction between "contributory" and
"noncontributory" programs seems to carry great political weight, it is unclear how
this could support statutory distinctions between mothers and children for consti-
tutional purposes. Although SI may have been designed to resemble private life
insurance programs that occasionally provide an ex-wife with a windfall on her ex-
husband's death, the federal government is bound by constitutional requirements
of rationality that private insurance companies do not face. Preserving the
"contributory" facade of a particular transfer program hardly appears to be a state
interest of enough magnitude to justify depriving families whose ostensible
"contributor" happens to be alive of their sole means of survival, or parents of their
fundamental child rearing rights.
247. Courts have traditionally placed strong presumptions behind a husband's
obligation to support his wife and children, and it is possible that a presumption of
intent to support could be drawn from these cases. See, e.g., Shine v. Shine, 802
F. 2d 583, 583 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that alimony obligations are not discharged
under bankruptcy laws absent explicit statutory mention). However, this does not
explain why the ex-husband's death should raise the amount of support, or trans-
form a temporary discretionary benefit into a permanent entitlement. In most
states, a woman on AFDC may retain only $50 in child support above and beyond
her grant; the rest goes to reimburse the state for the AFDC costs. 1995 GREEN
BOOK, supra note 5, at 336-37.
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Even if the government were to narrow SI to include only
widows and divorced women whose husbands actually paid sup-
port, the type of support a woman received would still turn en-
tirely on her husband's behavior. Either distinction, in the end,
rewards or punishes a woman based entirely on her ability to pre-
dict whether their husband is more likely to die than to abandon
or abuse her years after the marriage. Whatever the value of such
accurate precognition to those who possess it, it is questionable as
a legitimate state interest on which to base a social policy with
such consequences for innocent third parties: the children of the
families No distinction, other than luck, separates child recipients
of SI from those receiving AFDC. At this level, the distinction be-
comes entirely arbitrary-in other words, irrational, and hence a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Conclusion
The current movement for AFDC time limits and elimination
of entitlement is fueled by ignorance and prejudice. 248 In a just
world, educating the public about the facts of AFDC would suffice
to bury these misconceptions. In this world, however, the courts
are often the last resort when prejudice overtakes majoritarian in-
stitutions. 249 The Fourteenth Amendment suggests two interre-
lated grounds for overturning these policies. The jurisprudence
under the Due Process Clause suggests that AFDC cutoffs consti-
tute an unwarranted imposition on parents' right to make funda-
mental choices about the "care and management" of their children,
including the necessary degree of association with them; in some
cases, these policies would interfere with the basic right to physi-
cal custody. Because only single parents are asked to forfeit their
parental rights, and one select group of single parents-those eli-
gible for SI-is exempted from any question of loss of these fun-
damental rights or of income necessary for survival, AFDC time
limits and selective denials of entitlement should be invalidated
under the Equal Protection Clause.
SI provides a far better model for dealing with single parent
poverty than AFDC. SI provides an income floor sufficient to pro-
248. See WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 2-14, 170-81 (analyzing the racial and
gender ideologies driving AFDC discourse).
249. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(identifying prejudice as a "special condition" triggering a need for heightened
scrutiny); see also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado
referendum provision excluding gays and lesbians from coverage of antidiscrimina-
tion laws); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating California refer-
endum provision granting right to racial discrimination in housing).
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vide most of its recipients with a decent standard of living; by
minimizing the stress of poverty and freeing its recipients from the
time-consuming chores of survival on an inadequate income, 250 it
maximizes the time and energy parents have available for caring
for children and working to improve their own circumstances. The
flexible structure of SI recognizes that single parents' duties to
their children may make it impractical to work full-time outside
the home, at the same time allowing them to bring in extra money
in the part-time jobs that characterize the modern economy with-
out penalty. Even full-time work is not an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion, as SI provides a cushion of security if it becomes necessary to
cut back.
By casting the issue in terms of AFDC versus SI, therefore,
the ideal would be for a judge to remedy the unconstitutional fea-
tures of welfare "reform" by enjoining the government to expand
SI to include all children in single-parent households. 25 1 More
250. See supra note 125.
251. No lesser distinction would erase the basic irrationality of classifying chil-
dren according to the characteristics of their parents. Redefining SI to include all
children of dead fathers would destroy the program's "contributory" facade and
solve nothing. Expanding SI to all children with widowed or divorced mothers
would create an illegitimacy classification which would not be substantially tai-
lored to any important state interest. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
A judge could conceivably shrink SI to include only those children whose father
died while the parents were still together, but their situation does not differ meas-
urably from children who have been abandoned or whose mothers have left abu-
sive situations. However, this might be constitutional under the doctrine that
Congress need regulate only one step at a time. See supra note 213 and accompa-
nying text.
It is possible to redefine SI to include a few defined categories of single parent
families: (1) those produced by the death of a parent, (2) by abandonment and (3)
by abuse. Abuse and abandonment, however, are not always easily defined con-
cepts. Moreover, to avoid an illegitimacy classification, one would have to extend
these benefits to unwed couples where the father had lived with the child. This is
probably one point at which a limited SI could stop.
However, if a couple, married or not, did separate voluntarily and the father
supported the children and later died or stopped contributing, the mother could
make a claim that she was dependent on that support. This in turn raises the
question of how much support from the father should then be necessary to trigger
SI, and the fact that SI eligibility rests completely with the father. The next step
is couples who separate voluntarily but where the father never pays support, al-
though asked; the next is those where the father cannot pay support because he
simply lacks the money. See supra note 25.
At this point, we are left with two types of families outside of SI: those where
the mother voluntarily left the father for some reason short of abuse and refused
or did not ask for support from a father ready, willing and able to provide it, and
those where the father was never in the picture at all. A legislature may be able to
justify providing these groups with lesser benefits under rational basis review, but
it could not exclude them entirely or impose time limits without facing questions of
parental rights and distinguishing among children based solely on their parents'
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likely, the judge would strike the time limits and elimination of
entitlement in the recent Act but hold that differing benefit levels
and conditions were permissible under Jefferson, 252 essentially re-
turning to the status quo of AFDC The underlying problems of
miserly AFDC benefit levels and entrapping rules would still exist,
however, so the drive for reform would continue. Since even the
current Congress would probably be reluctant to abolish all federal
aid for children including SI, the constitutional prohibitions on
punitive measures would likely channel future welfare reform in
more constructive directions.253
If courts were governed entirely by precedent and logic, the
Supreme Court should have little trouble finding a parental right,
and no trouble invalidating the AFDC/SI distinction on equal pro-
tection grounds. Unfortunately, courts have political agendas, and
several of the decisions relied on in this article were by narrow
majorities of now-retired Justices with views quite different from
many members of the current Supreme Court. Even though win-
ning this case would be far from certain in the current political
climate, bringing it would be well worth the effort given the possi-
actions.
One may observe that this Note has said little about two-parent families with
no means of support, and that such families are functionally little different from
one-parent families where the noncustodial parent is willing to pay support but
lacks the resources. These families must receive support as well; there is no ra-
tional reason to penalize children for having fathers decent enough to stick around
in tough times. Although a flat benefit cutoff is impermissible because it would
force the separation of families where fathers could not find work, in this kind of
family it might be reasonable to impose job training requirements.
252. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding different benefit lev-
els for elderly, disabled and AFDC families).
253. An enlightened court could hold the rules which reduce AFDC by one dollar
for each dollar a recipient earns in the labor market to amount to an impermissi-
ble invasion of rights of parental choice, because in practice they force an all-or-
nothing decision between full-time employment and pure AFDC subsistence. See
supra notes 2 and 124. At a minimum, any serious welfare reform should provide
universal access to health care and affordable housing. Besides job creation, re-
form that emphasizes employment must provide an adequate child care system
and other measures to make the workplace friendlier to parents. While an SI-type
income support system could blunt the impact of the explosion of low-paying, part-
time and temporary jobs, a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy should force busi-
ness to provide jobs on which a worker can support a family without government
help, rather than socializing the human costs generated by its drive for profits.
Evidence suggests that providing jobs in which a single worker can support a
family will contribute toward solving the problems of the inner city, including its
high rates of single parenthood. See WILSON, supra note 16, at 63-108. A compre-
hensive attempt to deal with these problems, however, requires dealing with the
forces that perpetuate racial segregation, which in turn concentrates poverty and
amplifies the attendant social disruptions, feeding a cycle of decline. See generally
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 20.
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bility of preventing immeasurable losses to the well-being, the po-
tential and perhaps the lives of millions of children.254
254. This is not merely hyperbole. In 1890, muckraking journalist Jacob A. Riis
reported that institutions called "baby-farms" placed newspaper advertisements
offering cash to place the children of indigent unwed mothers up for adoption.
JACOB A. RIIS, How THE OTHER HALF LIvES 147-48 (Dover Publications 1971)
(1901). The "baby-farms" then fed the children sour milk and drugs to keep them
quiet and allowed them to starve to death, with inexperienced doctors called in to
record a false cause of death. Id. Even assuming this sort of institutionalized
murder does not arise, newspapers already report instances of infanticide or ex-
treme neglect by extremely poor mothers. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at
179 (telling of a twelve-year-old mother in Brooklyn housing project throwing her
newborn down a trash chute). Such instances can only increase as more and more
children are forced into deeper and deeper poverty. Moreover, the violent crime,
homelessness and malnutrition that will inevitably result from withdrawal of cash
assistance will only cause additional childhood deaths, already more common in
Harlem than in Bangladesh. Id. at 175.
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